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Preface
Anthropogenic climate change is among the greatest threats to humanity and
an impending tragedy for the ecosystem that sustains it. Limiting the effects
of climate change on society, the global economy, and the Earth system will be
one of the most challenging endeavors for my generation and those to come.
Climate models from the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC)
Special Report on Global Warming (2018) project extreme temperatures and in-
creases in frequency and intensity of heavy precipitation and drought in the com-
ing decades. Climate change has already impacted natural and human systems
around the world. Many land and ocean ecosystems and the services that they
provide are changing. The climate-related risks to health, economic certainty,
and food and water security, are projected to increase with global warming of
1,5◦C above pre-industrial levels. Without significant regime change, the globe
is on track to overshoot this level of warming. According to IPCC (2018), to
meet the 1,5◦C with limited overshoot, global net anthropogenic CO2 emissions
must decline by 45% compared to 2010 levels by 2030 and reach net zero emis-
sions by 2050. To achieve these extensive emissions reductions the international
community must unite under a common goal.
The European Commission (EC) introduced the European Green Deal in De-
cember 2019 with the objective that the EU is the first climate-neutral continent
by 2050 (EC, 2019a). The EC outlines a stepping stone to achieving this goal
in their 2030 Climate Target Plan, which is a 55% emissions reduction below
1990 levels by 2030 (EC, 2020). Accounting for nearly 25% of the EU’s GHG
emissions, the transport sector is key to realizing the emissions reductions goals.
According to the European Environment Agency (EEA), road transport accounts
for over 70% of all GHG emissions from the transport sector (EEA, 2017). Con-
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sequently, the EC has developed a low-emission road transport strategy with
three key areas for action: increasing the efficiency of the transport system, fast-
tracking deployment of low-emission transport alternatives, and transitioning to
zero-emissions vehicles (EC, 2016).
In this dissertation, I methodically analyze proposed EU policies that address
each of these action areas and evaluate the cost-effectiveness and efficiency of
each policy in achieving significant emissions reduction. I limit the scope of my
analysis to light passenger transport and heavy road freight. As instruments for
this analysis, I design theoretical models to depict the mechanisms underlying
supply and demand and then calibrate the models to illustrate the relative costs
of each policy scenario. The main contributions of this dissertation are three-
fold. First, it investigates the importance of endogenous technical progress in
existing and nascent technologies for achieving a cost-competitive low-emission
transport system. Second, it examines the value of policy coordination amongst
EU member states by scrutinizing incongruous national emissions targets. Third,
it studies the impact of levying a distance tax that covers the external costs of
road transport.
This dissertation is organized in three chapters, each of which addresses one
or more of the EC’s strategic action areas for achieving low-emission mobility.
Chapters 1 and 3 are co-authored papers (with Stef Proost, KU Leuven) and
Chapter 2 is single-authored. In the following, I will provide a synopsis of the
primary results of this dissertation. A brief summary of each chapter can be
found at the end of this preface.
The main instrument used by the EU to reduce CO2 emissions in the light passen-
ger car sector will be the limitation of the emissions of new cars sold in the EU in
2030 to practically half of the average emission level in 2019 (EC, 2019a). Electric
vehicles are treated as zero-emission cars and, therefore, are key to achieving the
emission reduction target. This dissertation compares how targeted consumer
and supply chain policy instruments affect the share of electric vehicles adopted
in the EU market (Chapter 1). Using a two-period model for the car manufac-
turing sector with gasoline car producers and electric car producers, I compare
the cost efficiency of different policies to decrease CO2 emissions. I model several
policies that generate endogenous technological progress, such as tradable fuel
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efficiency standards, portfolio mandates for the share of electric vehicles, carbon
taxes, vehicle purchase taxes, and subsidies for R&D. The primary question of
this exercise is whether the current EU policy instrument of a tradable carbon
emissions standard is optimal for achieving emissions reduction in light passenger
transport. The central quantitative finding is that this instrument outperforms
a portfolio mandate for the share of electric vehicles because it contains an in-
centive not only to lower the costs of electric vehicles but also to improve the
fuel efficiency of existing gasoline-powered vehicles.
In 2019, the EU set a fuel economy standard for heavy freight trucks to reduce
the fleet-wide average emissions for new trucks by 15% compared to 2019 levels
starting in 2025 and by 30% starting in 2030. Some EU member countries find
this standard to be too lax and are actively developing stricter national policies.
This dissertation examines this quandary of incongruous national and EU policy
in two ways. First, it investigates the impact of this incongruity on the cost of
avoided carbon emissions and examines the potential for carbon leakage (Chapter
2). Second, it assesses how international competition affects investment in new
infrastructure for zero-emission transport systems (Chapter 3).
The first inquiry into this quandary asks how a stricter fuel economy standard
for heavy freight trucks in one EU member country affects emissions reduction
behavior in the rest of the EU. For this analysis, I construct a dynamic partial
equilibrium model of the heavy freight truck market and calibrate it using EU
data. One key quantitative finding is that all emissions reductions in the stricter
country that go beyond the EU standard will leak to the rest of the EU, because
the rest of the EU can relax their reduction goals while maintaining the EU
standard. Another key result is that one EU member country introducing a
stricter standard can substantially lower the average cost of carbon savings for
all EU members. This is because the stricter standard intensifies innovation in
the truck manufacturing sector; as R&D investment increases the fuel efficiency
significantly improves. With fuel efficiency improvement, trucking companies
must purchase fewer high cost high fuel efficiency trucks to meet the EU standard.
When there is one standard across the EU, over 90% of trucks must have high
fuel efficiency, whereas when there is one country with a stricter standard the
share drops below 75%. In this way, the total capital cost of the trucking fleet
is substantially lower, which decreases the overall cost of carbon saved. The
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final important result is that the magnitude of a feebate policy has a significant
impact on the fuel efficiency improvement and producer investment in R&D,
while there is no effect on carbon leakage. Without a feebate system in place to
make the purchase cost of high fuel efficiency trucks more attractive to trucking
companies, producers invest significantly more in R&D to improve fuel efficiency
and drive operating costs down.
With the second inquiry into this quandary of incongruous policy, this disser-
tation asks what would be the outcome of the non-cooperative game between a
forerunner country that wants to install electric highways for heavy road freight
trucks and a neighboring country that does not install electric highways. In this
analysis, I design a strategic game with three players: the forerunner country,
the lagging neighbor, and trucking companies. The neighboring country deter-
mines the level of its investment in catenary electric highway infrastructure and
distance pricing policy for diesel and electric trucks based on the investment and
policies of the forerunner country. Seeing the different distance pricing schemes,
the trucking companies then decide which type of truck to purchase and operate
in each country. The central quantitative finding is that the determining factor
for a neighbor country to switch to electric trucks is the technological progress
for catenary electric trucks that enables a decrease in the operating costs and
makes electric trucks cheaper to use than diesel trucks.
In summation, this dissertation highlights the variation in cost-effectiveness and
efficiency across several proposed policies for emissions reductions in light pas-
senger and heavy freight road transport. It allocates newfound importance to
choosing the optimal policy mix in each scenario, as the policies will have a sig-
nificant impact not only on the overall cost of saved carbon emissions, but also
on the amount of investment in innovative low- and zero-emission technologies.
In addition, this dissertation presents a new perspective on the value of policy
coordination – or lack thereof – for carbon emissions reductions.
Chapter 1 In this chapter, I use a two-period model for a dynamic cost com-
parison of two main types of policy instruments: carbon emission standards for
new cars and a portfolio mandate with a minimum of electric vehicle sales. This
chapter contributes to the literature in three key ways. First, it endogenizes the
progress in the costs and performance of electric and gasoline vehicles by mak-
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ing technological progress a function of the policy instruments that are used.
Second, it considers the role of the batteries in electric vehicles to increase the
share of renewable energy in the transport sector via ’vehicle to grid’ technology.
Further, this chapter acknowledges the different vehicle deployment externalities
as well as the network externality that arises in the development of electric vehi-
cle charging infrastructure. Finally, it assesses a wide range of policy options to
stimulate the penetration of electric vehicles. The numerical calibration shows
that the market share of electric vehicles depends strongly on the type of policy
instrument used but that the share of electric vehicles is not necessarily a good
indicator for a successful carbon policy. The main result of this chapter is that
a carbon emissions standard achieves emission reductions at a much lower cost
than a portfolio mandate for electric vehicles.
An earlier version of this chapter has been published as CESifo Working Paper
No. 7789.
Chapter 2 This chapter asks: how does one or more member nations enact-
ing a stricter fuel economy standard impact the emissions reduction behavior
for the rest of the EU? Further, to what extent is there carbon leakage and
how does incongruous national and international policy affect the total cost of
achieving the EU fuel economy standard? To answer these questions, I develop
a two-period partial equilibrium model for the heavy freight truck manufactur-
ing sector where each producer maximizes profits subject to a constraint on the
average emissions intensity of the truck fleet sold. Producers invest in R&D in
the first period to lower the marginal cost of fuel efficiency technologies in the
second period. Demand for trucks is split between two regions: the member na-
tions adopting stricter fuel economy standards and the rest of the EU. With the
market equilibria for each region, I can evaluate the effects of incongruous fuel
economy standards on the rate of high fuel efficiency truck adoption, the invest-
ment in fuel efficiency improvement technologies, and the regional distribution
of carbon emissions. For a more comprehensive understanding of the impact of
R&D, I conduct several policy simulations demonstrating that the magnitude of
a Bonus-Malus policy has a significant impact on the fuel efficiency improvement
and producer investment in R&D. Further, I conduct several policy simulations
to demonstrate the impact of the size of the region opting for a stricter fuel econ-
omy standard on the magnitude of inadvertent carbon leakage in the rest of the
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EU and the distribution of costs between the regions. This chapter reveals an
inadvertent trade-off between a Bonus-Malus feebate system and the producer
investment in R&D.
Chapter 3 The main purpose of this chapter is to provide a deeper understand-
ing of how international competition affects investment in new infrastructure and
distance tax pricing for long-haul electric trucks. It analyzes the possible pricing
and investment strategy of one forerunner country that wants to invest in electric
trucks and catenary electric highway infrastructure, but faces lagging neighbors.
The forerunner can make the use of electric trucks mandatory on its own territory
by using very high road charges for diesel trucks. If it has opted for a catenary
system, it faces still the choice of how it will price the use of its electric mo-
torways. Heavy freight truck transportation within the EU is increasingly long
distance rather than local, so the ultimate costs and emission reduction success
will depend on whether the neighbors follow a forerunner country and how the
forerunner deals with international trucking. What neighboring countries will do
in response depends on strategic considerations, there will only be coordination
when it brings significant benefits. International diesel trucks, when crossing the
border of a forerunner country, will have to choose between paying high charges
and transferring the load into an electric truck. Therefore, this chapter exam-
ines under what conditions neighbors with different climate policies will choose
to follow an ambitious forerunner? I study the outcome of this international
coordination game exploring the non-cooperative outcome varying the relative
size of the forerunner in international truck traffic and varying the cost of elec-
tric highways. The key insight of this chapter is that the major reason why a
neighbor country would follow a forerunner is whether the technological progress
for catenary electric trucks enables a significant decrease in the operating costs
making electric trucks cheaper to use than diesel trucks.
An earlier version of this chapter has been published as CESifo Working Paper
No. 8876.
Chapter 1
What is the role for Electric
Vehicles in the decarbonization
of the car transport sector in
Europe?
1.1 Introduction
While countries across the EU continue to decrease national emissions through
the EU ETS and building and electric appliance regulations, transport emissions
continue to grow. Road transport is responsible for 73% of the transport emis-
sions, and more specifically cars account for 44,5% of GHG emissions (EEA,
2017). The EU relies on two overlapping instruments to reduce CO2 emissions
in the light vehicle segment. First, there is the minimum 10% share of renewable
fuels in the car sector and second, there is the CO2 performance standard for
passenger vehicles (EC, 2016). In the last years, the car sector relied mainly on
biofuels to reach the mandated share of 10% renewable power in the transport
sector. However, the recent directive on renewable energy in the EU (RED II),
establishes new biofuel sustainability criteria that will be difficult to meet with
the current biofuels; the minimum renewable energy share of transport will be
met by the introduction of Electric Vehicles (EVs).
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The main instrument used by the EU to reduce CO2 emissions will be the limi-
tation of the emissions of new cars sold in the EU in 2030 to practically half of
the average emission level in 2019 (59g of CO2 per vehicle kilometer rather than
the 110-115g emitted in 2019) (EC, 2019b). The EVs count as zero-emission
cars and are therefore an important element in achieving the emission reduction
target.
In addition, EVs can act as an important complement to the generalized use of
renewable electricity that is part of the European strategy to achieve the Paris
Agreement targets. The battery of EVs, when connected to the grid can help
to bridge the periods with low and high renewable production. In this way,
EVs can add flexibility to the increasingly renewable power sector by acting
as storage medium and shifting supply from the renewable off-peak to the less
renewable peak demand hours. In addition, EVs can save electricity generation
capacity and help in balancing the power sector. EVs will be essential to reduce
carbon emissions in the transport sector1 and to satisfy the renewable transport
objective.
In this chapter, we compare how targeted consumer and supply chain policy
instruments affect the share of EVs. The direct effects of regulations and price
incentives on EV penetration have already been widely studied using empirical
consumer choice models. We offer three complementary contributions to this lit-
erature. The first contribution is to clarify the discussion on the role of different
policy instruments on future costs and performance via R&D and learning by
doing, thereby including the lagged effects of policy instruments. This is nec-
essary to arrive at a correct dynamic cost comparison of policies. The second
contribution is to also include a reduced representation of the power sector and
the third contribution is to include some external effects of car use in addition
to climate impacts.
To include the learning by doing and the R&D effects, we adapt the renewable
electricity model of Fischer and Newell (2008) to the passenger car market. EVs
can become cheaper through two knowledge building effects: learning by doing
1As the emissions in the EU electricity sector are capped by the tradable emission scheme
(ETS), the net carbon emissions of an EV are zero. Since 2018, matters are more complicated
as the EU-ETS has been turned into a hybrid system because the number of permits issued
each year will be a function of the stock of unused allowances. See Perino (2018) and Bruninx,
Ovaere, and Delarue (2019).
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and pure R&D. Also, the fuel efficiency of conventional Gasoline Vehicles (GVs)
can improve over time thanks to pure R&D. How much both technologies improve
depends on the policies in place. Policies can incentivize car producers to produce
more electric cars (learning by doing) but can also stimulate them to invest in
R&D that reduces the costs of EVs and the cost of more fuel efficient GVs.
Consumers are differentiated in function of the number of days per year they
make a short or long trip. This differentiation serves two purposes. As EVs still
have a difficulty to cover the long trips, this will segment the consumers between
EV adopters and GV adopters. The number of days with short trips will also
determine the availability of batteries for Vehicle to Grid (V2G) storage. The
electricity production model used is simple and the V2G option is modelled as
in Greaker, Hagem, and Proost (2019).
We use a two-period model for a simplified dynamic cost comparison of two
main types of policy instruments: carbon emission standards for new cars and
a portfolio mandate with a minimum of electric vehicle sales. This numerical
comparison shows that the market share of EVs depends strongly on the type
of policy instrument used but that the share of EVs is not necessarily a good
indicator for a successful carbon policy. We find that the carbon emission stan-
dards for new cars with a tradable permit scheme across car producers achieves
the emissions reduction goals at a lower cost than the portfolio mandate that
focusses on a minimum share of new electric cars.
This chapter is organized as follows: In Section 1.2 we provide a review of the
existing literature on policies for EV adoption. In Section 1.3 we survey the
existing policy instruments with a focus on the EU and in particular on Germany.
In Section 1.4 we present the formal model and in Section 1.5 we derive the
effects of different policy instruments in the theoretical model. In Section 1.6 we
discuss the calibration of the model using data for the German and European
EV market. We present the policy results in Section 1.7, Section 1.8 delineates
the key caveats of our model, and Section 1.9 concludes.
1.2 Literature review
There are several strands of literature that are significant to our research. We
begin by reviewing the existing methods for modelling the impacts of climate
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policy on the development of the transport sector. This is followed by an outline
of the research on EVs and the electricity grid. Next, we examine the literature
on policy intervention in the transport sector and we conclude with the literature
on the infrastructure challenges of widespread EV adoption.
To accurately account for the role of new technologies in climate policy, there are
two approaches: an aggregate economy wide approach and a sectoral approach.
Within the aggregate approach, one method is to take an existing computable
general equilibrium (CGE) model and build out the transport sector in more
detail to differentiate between a limited number of vehicle classes (see Paltsev
et al. (2018), Zhang et al. (2017)). Another method within the aggregate model
approach is to use an integrated assessment model which offers a detailed break-
down of the energy sector and then add a more detailed transport-energy demand
function (see Pietzcker et al. (2013), Tattini, Maurizio, and Karlsson (2018), van
der Zwaan, Keppo, and Johnsson (2013)). In the aggregate approach, techno-
logical progress is usually taken on board via a learning curve. The learning
curve relates the future costs of a given technology to the number of installa-
tions. These models excel in trading off efforts in different sectors but fall short
in the selection of policy instruments. In addition, the use of the learning curve
approach tends to overstate the technological progress effects of additional instal-
lations (Nordhaus, 2014). The second, sectoral or partial equilibrium approach,
can focus much better on the effects of policy instruments on the car transport
market.
In this chapter, we employ a partial equilibrium model of the car transport
market. In his recent survey of technological progress, Popp (2019) stresses the
importance of integrating endogenous technological progress in the assessment
of policies. For the integration of endogenous technological progress, we follow
a similar approach as Fischer and Newell (2008). They use a stylized model of
the electricity sector with two sub-sectors (a representative fossil fuel firm and
renewable firm) which incorporates learning by doing and R&D investment for
renewables with two stages to allow time for innovation. Using this simple model,
they assess various policy options for reducing carbon emissions in the electricity
sector. Eggert and Greaker (2014) modelled endogenous technological progress
in a similar way for biofuels and their use in cars. Creti, Kotelnikova, Meunier,
and Ponssard (2018) used a partial equilibrium model of the car sector to analyze
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when learning by doing would propel the hydrogen car into the market. In our
model, consumers demand car transportation services that they can buy from
gasoline car producers and from electric car producers. We allow for endogenous
technical progress for EVs but also for fossil fueled cars and the technical progress
originates not only from learning by doing, but also from pure R&D investment.
The literature on Electric Vehicles (EVs) focuses mainly on the speed of penetra-
tion of EVs as a new technology and on the possible barriers. The penetration is
a function of the cost decrease over time and depends on the importance of car
attributes such as the range and the refueling network. See Brownstone, Bunch,
and Train (2000) for one of the first studies. Li, Long, Xing, and Zhou (2017)
and Coffman, Bernstein, and Wee (2017) are recent reviews of the consumer be-
havior towards EVs. van Biesebroeck and Verboven (2018) provide a survey on
the barriers to the large-scale production and market penetration of EVs.
There are several papers focused on identifying the various types of policy inter-
vention for EV penetration in the transportation sector (see Anderson and Sallee
(2011), Anderson and Sallee (2016)). van der Steen et al. (2015) provide a gen-
eral overview of government policy intervention strategies and differentiate the
type and effect of policies implemented upstream on the producers, downstream
on the consumers, and system-wide on the network. Hardman, Chandan, Tal,
and Turrentine (2017) find in their review that financial purchase incentives have
been effective in increasing the sales of battery electric vehicles (BEVs) and plug-
in hybrid electric vehicles (PHEVs). Maciuli, Konstantinaviciute, and Pilinkiene
(2018) examine the different opportunities for local and national governments to
stimulate EV adoption.
In this chapter, we assess the effectiveness of policies aimed at both the supply
and demand sides of the EV market. An important assumption in this chapter
is that both consumer and producers act in a rational way. Policy makers in
the EU and US often rely on a stream of literature that states car buyers are
behaving myopically: consumers underestimate future fuel savings (see Brown
(2001), Greene (2010), Busse, Knittel, and Zettelmeyer (2013)). Recent econo-
metric evidence for the European car market contradicts this assumption and
shows that consumers take into account approx. 90% of future fuel consumption
costs (Grigolon, Reynaert, and Verboven, 2018). Reynaert (2020) contends EU
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car manufacturers behave as rational producers in their non-compliance to the
current carbon emission standard. According to Reynaert, the compliance costs
of the carbon emissions standard are too high compared to the current car fuel
prices. In the absence of strict enforcement, the producers offer cars that mini-
mize the total user costs of cars which results in less efficient cars than required
by the standard.
Richardson (2013) reviews the literature regarding the ability of EVs to improve
the integration of renewable energy sources into the existing electric grid. Fur-
ther, Dallinger, Gerda, and Wietschel (2013) state that in a future with high
renewable energy penetration in the electricity sector, EVs can store excess re-
newable energy produced in the off-peak periods and use it in the peak period
where there is less renewable production. While we do not model the electricity
sector explicitly, we model Vehicle to Grid (V2G) and consider the impacts of
shifting electricity demand from off-peak (high renewable production) to peak
periods (low renewable production).
There is limited literature concerned with the infrastructure challenges of EV
adoption. Consumers with a garage can charge their car at home but those
without a garage or those who are on a long trip have to rely on the public
charging infrastructure. Charging infrastructure for cars is a well-defined network
good and therefore exhibits network effects. Greaker and Midttømme (2016)
assert that a failure to account for network effects can hinder the adoption of
existing clean technologies. Further, Greaker and Kristoffersen (2017) argue that
the lack of charging technology harmonization contributes to negative network
externalities and impedes widespread EV adoption. Springel (2018) studied the
Norwegian EV market, where penetration of EVs in new car sales is high (>
30% in Oslo). Her estimates find that consumers are more likely to purchase
EVs when the network is denser and that charging stations are more likely to
enter when there is a larger stock of EVs. Li, Long, Chen, and Geng (2017) study
the US market where penetration is much lower. They also find that diverting
some of the subsidies for the purchase of EVs to the development of the charging
network could be more effective in terms of EV penetration. Zhou and Li (2018)
focus on the critical mass problem in the deployment of charging stations where
the low adoption equilibrium may be the outcome in more than half of the U.S.
Metropolitan Statistical Areas. We emphasize the production side of EVs and
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GVs, but we include a simplified version of the charging station network effects
via an average charging cost that is decreasing in the share of EVs.
The passenger car sector is an important source of carbon emissions but is also
characterized by several other externalities, including congestion, non-carbon air
pollution, noise, and accidents. The existing set of policy instruments to stim-
ulate the adoption of EVs carries the risk of making these externalities worse.
Wangsness et al. (2020) show that the Norwegian EV policy mix, which guaran-
tees a low variable cost to EV users, induces a significant increase in car use and
a decrease of Public Transport use in Oslo. This emphasizes the importance of
including these externalities in the EV promotion policy.
Compared to the literature, this chapter offers several contributions. First, it
endogenizes the progress in the costs and performance of EVs and of GVs by
making technological progress a function of the policy instruments that are used.
Second, it considers the role of the batteries in the EV to increase the share of
renewable energy in the electricity sector via V2G. Further, we consider the
different car use externalities as well as the network externality that arises in the
development of EV charging infrastructure. Finally, it assesses a wide range of
policy options to stimulate the penetration of EVs.
1.3 Current policy incentives for EV adoption
In the EU, there are two policy directives for the car manufacturers. First, there
is the carbon emission standard for cars that requires a maximum emission rate
of 95 g/vehicle-km by 2021 and the decision is to further decrease the emission
rate by 37,5% in 2030 (EP, 2019). Second, there is the portfolio mandate requir-
ing a minimum of renewable energy in the transport sector, which was mainly
geared to be renewable biofuels. However, the new RED II policy package that
is being adopted by the European Parliament is now much more demanding on
the sustainability of the biofuels than in the RED I package. As this implies that
the role of biofuels will decrease, the role of electricity has to increase.
The EU also requires national governments to support the achievement of the
policy objectives for the manufacturers by using additional policies at the level of
the carbon intensity of the fuel used, at the level of the refueling infrastructures,
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and at the level of the adoption of EVs by car buyers. Enactment and enforce-
ment of these initiatives are left to the member states. Some member states have
added a strict target for the share of EVs in new vehicle sales. These member
state policies have been surveyed in OECD/IEA (2017) and almost all member
states have adopted a combination of reduced purchase taxes (or higher subsi-
dies) and subsidized recharging points. All EU countries offer slightly different
policy mixes. Rather than use an average value of policy instrument implemen-
tation across the EU, we use present policies in Germany, the largest car market
in the EU, as representative for the EU.
Germany offers, in addition to motor vehicle tax exemption and purchase sub-
sidies, parking privileges to EV drivers (EAFO, 2019).2 While many countries
implement consumer-targeted policies, only the member countries that produce
cars enact specific R&D policies for producers.
In this chapter, the baseline scenario will assume that the main EU-policy goal
is a 37,5% reduction of the carbon emission standard of new cars by 2030 com-
pared to 2021. This requirement is defined at the Tank to Wheel emission level.
We implement this requirement at the aggregate sales level for cars. The EVs
are considered as zero carbon emission vehicles in the regulation. This is correct
in the case of the EU where the electricity sector is covered under the EU ETS
cap. For the sake of generality, we will also present carbon emissions as a func-
tion of the type of electricity used to fuel the cars as this is more relevant for
other continents. Given the difficulties to define sustainable biofuels or produce
substitute carbon free liquid fuels, we assume that the electrification of the car
stock will be the major way in which the renewable fuel obligation for transport
fuels (RED-II) will be met. This means that we will neglect the RED-II policy
constraint in our policy assessment.
Present market shares (2015-2020) for BEV are of the order of 6% in Germany
and 2% in most EU countries (IEA, 2021).
2The tax exemption is valid for 10 years after the purchase date of the EV (AIMVM, 2017).
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1.4 Building the model
1.4.1 The range of policy instruments
In this chapter, we estimate the impacts of different policy instruments. First,
we evaluate an aggregate tradable carbon emission standard. The second major
instrument we discuss is a portfolio mandate for electric cars. Both policy instru-
ments are imposed at the aggregate EU level for the sales of new cars. Next, we
discuss the effects of an EV purchase subsidy and a subsidy for en-route charging
equipment. Finally, we assess a high purchase tax for fossil fuel cars.
These instruments are always combined with a subsidy for R&D and the current
tax on motor fuels. Compared to most other sectors, the transport sector is
characterized by very different externalities (congestion, conventional air pollu-
tion, accidents, noise) where climate damage is only one of many. In Europe,
the major instrument for carbon emissions reduction is the high gasoline (and
diesel) tax, it acts as a carbon tax and is important in raising tax revenues. It
also keeps other externalities like congestion under control, be it inefficiently. In
Germany, the gasoline tax accounts for nearly 60% of the consumer fuel price.
Further, as shown in Figure 1.1 from the OECD (2013), the gasoline tax is nearly
300 e/tonne CO2, over ten times higher than the EU ETS price of 25 e/tonne
CO2. In an ideal scenario, one can use the gasoline tax as a pure carbon tax and
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Tax rate expressed in EUR per tonne of CO2Tax rate expressed in EUR per tonne of CO2
Tax base – energy use – expressed in thousands of tonnes of CO2[ETS-A] = all subject to the ETS
[ETS-P] = partially subject to the ETS
DEUTax Fuel tax credit or tax expenditure ж   Average 2010-11 ETS price
Figure 1.1: Effective carbon taxes by sector in Germany
complement it with other taxes (road pricing, other externality taxes, standards)
that target the other externalities. This would be a major structural change in
the way car transport would be taxed and would go beyond the scope of this
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chapter. Further, it would require the simultaneous treatment of all externalities
and this would no longer allow us to focus on the carbon efficiency (see Proost
and van Dender (2008) for an example). In order to have a correct comparison
between EV and GV for the non-climate externalities (noise, other air pollution),
we foresee a distance tax that is differentiated between EV and GV. We sum-
marize the different policy instruments discussed in this chapter in Table 1.1.
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1.4.2 The choice of cars by consumers
We consider only two technologies: gasoline or diesel vehicles3 (GV) and battery
electric vehicles (EV). There are two periods t = 1, 2, each representing a number
of years nt. Vehicle users are differentiated by the number of days with long
trips that they make in a year. This characteristic is important for two reasons.
3Diesel engines perform slightly better than gasoline vehicles in terms of net carbon emission
per vehicle-km. But since ’diesel-gate’, diesels have lost market share because the effective
abatement of conventional air pollution turned out to be more costly than before. In the rest
of this chapter we focus on gasoline technology but substituting it with diesel technology would
not make any difference at the level of aggregation of this chapter.
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First, long trips with an EV are more difficult when one must recharge en-route.
Second, days with short trips allow EVs to be used as storage for the grid. In
the model presentation, we assume that we have M vehicle owners that are
uniformly distributed4 over the number of long trip days. The number of vehicle
owners and the length of the short and long trips are given. This means that
the mileage of each type of individual and of the total population are fixed. This
condensed model generates the shares of electric and gasoline vehicles for given
vehicle prices, fuel costs and taxes.
Let lm be the number of days with long trips for user m and (365−lm) the number
of days with short trips for user m. The total rental cost of a gasoline vehicle in
period t is the annuity of the purchase price plus the cost of use. The purchase
price of a gasoline vehicle is PGt , the producer price on an annual basis, plus the
annual vehicle ownership tax, τGt . As we use costs on an annual basis and as total
vehicle ownership as well as annual mileage is fixed for each population segment,
car purchase taxes and ownership taxes have the same effect. The usage cost UGt
is a function of the variable cost per km driven, vtg, and a tax per unit distance,
tGtd. This distance tax corrects for driving externalities such as noise, non-carbon
emissions, accidents, and traffic congestion. As gasoline vehicles may also make
progress in fuel efficiency over time, we introduce the fuel consumption per unit
distance, ft.
Therefore, the total annual cost of a user of type m of a gasoline vehicle with
unit fuel consumption ft is:
CG(m) = PG + τG + d(m) · UG (1.1)
where total annual distance d(m) = lm · dl + (365 − lm) · ds. Where ds and dl
are the distances covered during a short and long trip day. The user cost is
UGt = ft · vtg + tGtd where the variable cost vtg = rtg + ttg, with ttg the gasoline tax
and rtg the gasoline resource cost. As there is a direct proportionality between
the consumption of gasoline and the emission of carbon, the gasoline tax is a de
facto carbon tax.
We can calculate total annual carbon emissions per gasoline vehicle XGtm with
4In the simulations we use triangular distribution of the number of long days per car.
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the carbon emissions intensity factor per unit fuel consumed5 xclg .
XGtm = d(m) · ft · xclg (1.2)
We will make use of the imputed damage for carbon emissions, and define this as




tm · damcl (1.3)
We measure the non-climate annual external costs of gasoline vehicle operation
C(Y Gm ) in e per unit distance using y





N where yA represents externalities due to accidents and congestion,
yGOP represents non-carbon air pollution, and y
G
N represents noise pollution. These
additional external costs vary with the length of the trip, so we have yGl and y
G
s
for the non-climate external costs incurred during long trips and short trips,
respectively. For instance, the cost of accidents and congestion increases in the
length of the trip.
C(Y Gm ) = lm · dl · yGl + (365− lm) · ds · yGs (1.4)
The external costs of climate and other externalities do not enter the user cost,
but they are included in the social welfare calculation.
The purchase price of an electric vehicle is the producer price on an annual basis
PEt (B) plus the annual vehicle ownership tax (or subsidy), τ
E
t . The purchase
cost of an electric vehicle is increasing in its battery capacity B. The usage cost
depends on the length of the trip and is decreasing in the capacity of the battery.
For one short trip, the usage cost is
Uts(B) = ds(e · poff + tEtd)− (B − ds · e)(ppeak − poff ) (1.5)
where e is the energy efficiency of the EV. As poff and ppeak are the prices of
electricity in the off peak and peak period, Uts(B) is the cost of electricity used
to travel ds km, assuming the battery was charged during off-peak hours, plus
the tax per unit distance tEtd, minus the savings realized by using the car for
storage, i.e. selling back the unused energy to the grid, during peak hours. For
5We use a tank to wheel emission factor as this emission factor is also used in the EU
regulation.
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long trips the user incurs, instead of savings, additional electricity and disutility
costs of en-route charging. For one long trip, the usage cost is
Utl(B) = dl · tEtd +B · poff + (pch + z − P P · qEt )(dl · e−B) (1.6)
where pch is the price of electricity at the charging station, and z is the user’s
disutility from en-route charging in terms of time lost and P P · qE is the benefit
of a wider recharging network where P P is the recharging access cost reduction
of an extra EV and qE is the total number of electric vehicles. The user cost
of charging stations decreases as the total amount of EVs sold increases (see
Li, Long, Chen, and Geng (2017) and Springel (2018)). In the simple model,
we assume that all EVs use the same charging technology, such that we have
technology harmonization avoiding the harmonization issue. Following Greaker,
Hagem, and Proost (2019), we posit first that the cost of charging en- route is
sufficiently high so that for a short trip, there is never a need to recharge the EV,
so B > ds · e. Secondly, we assume that the battery cost in a car is higher than
the cost of a fixed stand-alone battery B < dl · e. In this way, we have lower and
upper bounds for the size of the car battery. For a given electric vehicle user,
the total annual cost is
CEt (m,B) = P
E
t (B) + τ
E
t + (365− lm)Uts + lm · Utl + CHEt (1.7)
where CHEt = k − st,ch and k is the total annuity cost of home charging equip-
ment for the user. This may be subsidized by an amount st,ch.
In the absence of a strict CO2 cap for the electricity sector, there can be CO2
emissions generated by charging EVs with fossil fuel electricity. Then we measure
the carbon emissions intensity of the peak electricity per kWh with xcle . We
assume that off-peak electricity is generated with renewable sources, therefore it
has negligible emissions. Under this assumption we can calculate total annual
emissions per vehicle, XEm.
XEm =
[
lm(dl · e−B)− (365− lm)(B − ds · e)
]
xcle (1.8)
We assume that the off-peak electricity is renewable while the peak electricity
is not. Note that, in this case, the substitution of peak electricity by renewable
electricity made possible by the use of spare battery capacity during short trips
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leads to a decrease of total carbon emissions.
There are non-climate external costs C(Y Em ) from operating an electric vehicle,
which we estimate in e per unit distance with yE. As with GVs, yE is the sum
of accident and traffic congestion yA, non-carbon air pollution y
E
OP , and noise
pollution yEN . Further, these external costs vary with trip length, so we have y
E
s
and yEl and we can express the total non-carbon external costs as a function of
trip length:
C(Y Em ) = lm · dl · yEl + (365− lm) · ds · yEs (1.9)
We assume that all vehicles contribute equally to congestion and accidents whether
they are GVs or EVs, so yA is constant across vehicle types. Further, we posit
that EVs are quieter than GVs, therefore yEN < y
G
N , and EVs produce less non-
climate emissions than GVs such that yEOP < y
G
OP .
We normalize the distribution of m users with the maximum number of long
trips m(l ≤ lmax) = 1 and the number of m users with the minimum number of
long trips m(l ≤ lmin) = 0. Let lo be the number of long trip days from which it
becomes interesting to have a GV, then we have the total number of EVs given
by
qEt = m(l ≤ lo) ·M
qGt = [1−m(l ≤ lo)] ·M
(1.10)
1.4.3 Gasoline vehicle production
The producers of GVs maximize profits under perfect competition. There is only
one standard type of gasoline vehicle and we assume users are not myopic: they
choose the car that has the lowest cost for their user profile.
We consider two cases for the cost functions for gasoline cars. In the first case the
fuel efficiency or carbon emissions standard6 is not constrained. Then, each pro-
ducer wants to offer a vehicle with a fuel consumption per mile f that minimizes
users’ costs and this implies that the carbon efficiency is a function of the fuel
cost and an average mileage. In the second case, the minimum carbon efficiency
6When less carbon intensive fuels (biofuels) are used, the fuel efficiency is not equivalent to
the carbon efficiency but as we assume a decreasing role for biofuels, we neglect this difference
in the rest of the chapter.
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is constrained by the government. In the EU, the second case is more realistic
as producers tend to underperform compared to the carbon emissions standard
(Reynaert, 2020): consumer fuel prices and the cost of more fuel-efficient cars
are such that fuel producers produce cars that are not carbon efficient enough.
Producers of gasoline vehicles can meet the carbon emissions standard by either
making their car more fuel efficient or by buying carbon efficiency credits fect
from producers of EVs at a price pfect. We assume that there is good monitoring
of the realized minimum fuel efficiency (here maximum fuel consumption per ve-
hicle km fmax) and that the fine is sufficiently high to make all car manufacturers
comply.
Following the Fischer and Newell (2008) technique to introduce endogenous tech-
nological progress, we assume that the gasoline car producers can, in the first
period, invest in a better knowledge base that helps to reduce the costs of more
carbon efficient vehicles in the second period. The knowledge base is produced
by two factors: learning by doing as well as by pure R&D. Learning by doing
decreases costs by drawing on the accumulated production, also known as the
experience curve approach. The pure R&D is the second way to increase the
knowledge base. It is difficult to separate the effects of learning by doing and
pure R&D. Aghion et al. (2016) in their study of the patents firm-level panel
data on auto industry innovation distinguishing between “dirty” internal com-
bustion engine and “clean” e.g., electric, hybrid, and hydrogen patents across
80 countries, show that both factors matter. They showed that the innovation
activities of all automobile producers react to fuel price incentives, that gasoline
car firms specialize in fuel efficiency patents and greener car producers specialize
in patents bringing down the costs of electric vehicles. They also show that there
are important localized spillovers. In our formulation, we limit the effect of the
knowledge base of gasoline cars to the costs that are specific to the fuel efficiency
efforts of gasoline cars. This is in line with the separation in Aghion et al. (2016)
between dirty patents and grey patents, where the grey patents are the ones that
are related to the reactions of the fossil fueled cars to fuel price changes. The
total investment in R&D for fuel efficiency and the learning by doing will then
reduce the fuel efficiency related costs in the second period.
The total knowledge base in the first period is KG1 , in second period is K
G
2 and
1.4. Building the model 22

















The total knowledge built up via investments hG in R&D for gasoline cars and
the accumulated production QG both contribute to the knowledge stock, where
n stands for the length of the period in years and q stands for the production
per year. R&D and learning-by-doing can be complements or substitutes. ηH
represents the elasticity of product costs with respect to R&D investment and ηQ
represents the elasticity of product costs with respect to cumulative production,
we refer to this mechanism as ’learning by doing’.
We now discuss the model equations assuming a tradable carbon emissions stan-
dard policy. The GV firm’s profit equals total sales times the producer price for
GV, PGt , minus a production tax on GV, φt, minus total production costs for
GV, G(qGt ), minus the expenses for R&D and minus the costs of the necessary
carbon efficiency credits it needs to buy when it does not meet the carbon emis-
sions standard. The firm maximizes the sum of profits in the first period, made
up of n1 years, and discounted profits from the second period, made up of n2
years. R(hG) is subsidized by the government at a rate σG.
ΠG = n1
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The production cost of GVs has constant returns to scale and consists of a
part that is non fuel-efficiency related (NFP ) and a part that is fuel efficiency
related. The fuel efficiency related costs will decrease when the knowledge level
KG increases. The cost of increasing fuel efficiency is quadratic in 1/f . The
knowledge level K is a function of learning by doing Q and investments in R&D
H for gasoline cars. At the start of the first period, the knowledge level is set to
1 but in the second period, the accumulation of knowledge decreases the costs
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of improved fuel efficiency.
G(KGt , q
G







(ig + 0.5jg · f−1t )f−11
]
(1.13)
We assume perfect competition in the production of cars, so every manufacturer
takes prices of cars in the two periods as given. Maximizing profits generates
equilibrium market prices for GV in the first and second period as well as firm
























































= 0⇒ i+ jf−1t = pefct
(1.14)
The first equation shows that the price of a GV will equal the marginal production
cost in the first period plus the carbon efficiency credits it will need per car minus
the cost decrease it can realize in the second period thanks to learning by doing
in the first period. Of the knowledge the firm did build up in the first period,
only a share ρ ≤ 1 can be captured by the firm due to spillovers that cannot be
valorized by patents7.
The investment in pure R&D helps to reduce the cost of more fuel efficient
vehicles in the second period, again only a share ρ is captured by the firm. The
level of fuel efficiency of cars is, in each period, pushed until the marginal cost
of more fuel efficiency equals the price of a carbon efficiency credit. Note that
knowledge efforts are directed mainly to reduce the cost of making cars more
fuel efficient: the stricter the carbon emissions standard, the higher the marginal
cost of fuel efficiency efforts, the higher the price of carbon efficiency credits and
the higher the payoff of knowledge building.
7This is a reduced form representation of a representative firm in a sector with innovation
spillovers. All knowledge is ultimately adopted and licensing revenues cancel out between firms.
See Fischer and Newell (2007).
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We will also model other policy instruments. A popular policy contender is the
portfolio mandate by which the car market has to reach minimum market share
α of EVs. This can be implemented via a tradable portfolio credit with a value
prport that will be received by EV manufacturers for every EV they sell and by
making the GV producers buy a proportion α/(1− α) of the portfolio credit for
each GV they sell. The portfolio credit cost is then added to the marginal cost of
the GV. Prices of GV will be increased and EV prices decreased until the desired
portfolio is reached.
1.4.4 Electric vehicle production
Similarly, EV producers maximize the sum of the discounted profits in the first
period and second period. The total cost in the first period consists of production
costs, G(KEt , q
E
t ) and the R&D investment made by the firm, (1 − σE)R(hE)
and the sales of carbon efficiency credits to the GV industry. Where qEt is the
production of EVs in period t, KEt is the knowledge stock for EVs and σE is
the share of R&D expenditure that is paid by the government. As the main
challenge in terms of technological progress is to make batteries cheaper (and
lighter), we assume that the knowledge stock serves to decrease the cost of the
battery component of EVs. Production costs are proportional in output and
decreasing and convex in knowledge stock. The knowledge stock is built up in
the first period by the total sales of EVs (learning by doing) and by the total
investment in pure R&D. EV producers maximize profits:
ΠE = n1
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where νt is the production tax (or subsidy) for EVs.
The production cost of EVs has constant returns to scale and consists of a non-
battery part (NBP ) and a battery part (B).
G(KEt , q
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The battery part decreases with additional knowledge but is linear in the battery
power per car. We have the same knowledge building formulae as with GVs (see


















The optimal production level of electric vehicles in the two periods and the




















































1.4.5 The electricity market
In this stylized model, the electricity market has two types of production: peak
fossil fuel production and off-peak renewable production. To represent the dif-
ferent costs of the peak and off-peak electricity, we have one peak electricity
production technology and one renewable production technology. Using peak
load pricing theory, the marginal cost of peak electricity (excluding climate per-
mits) equals ppeak and is equal to the variable fossil energy cost plus the capacity
cost divided by the length of the peak period. For the off-peak electricity we
have a cost poff . As we assume that the fossil fuel plant is only used in the peak
period and as we assume that there is no peak shifting in the total electricity
demand, we take the peak and off-peak prices of electricity as given and these can
be considered as the opportunity costs of peak and off-peak power. We can in-
clude in the model two types of electricity demand during the peak and off-peak:
demand by the vehicle sector and demand by all other sectors. The demand for
electricity by the car sector is determined by the share of EVs and the annual
distance that they travel. Demand for electricity by all other sectors is given
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by a representative demand function. But as long as the prices of electricity do
not change, we do not have to consider the demand for electricity of the other
sectors.
1.4.6 Social welfare function
In this welfare optimization problem, we maximize the sum of total consumer
surplus and producer surplus in the vehicle market and in the electricity market
plus the government surplus, represented by CSV , PSV , CS
ot
EL, PSEL and GS,
respectively. And we minimize the sum of the carbon and other external emis-






W = CSV + PSV +GS + CS
ot
EL + PSEL − CEY − CGY − CEX − CGX (1.19)
In the set up of the model, we assume that peak and off-peak electricity prices
are fixed in both periods, therefore we do not need to include electricity market
surplus (except for the EV owners) in the welfare maximization problem.
W = CSV + PSV +GS − CEY − CGY − CEX − CGX (1.20)
The total government surplus is given by the gasoline and electric vehicle pro-
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d(m) · (tEd,2) +
M∑
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d(m)(tGd,2 + f2 · tg,2)
(1.21)
Where we have included both the production and consumer taxes, summed over
the total distance travelled for each mode for each user.
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1.5 Solving the model
1.5.1 Market equilibrium
In our model, the car ownership and the car use are given. The equilibrium value
of interest is therefore the market share of GVs and EVs.
The major disadvantage of EVs compared to GVs is their limited range. So, we
can expect a user equilibrium where EVs are selected by consumers that make
mainly short trips. So, we look for lot , the number of long trips for user m where
she is indifferent between using a gasoline vehicle and an electric vehicle. To
do this we compare the total cost of both vehicles. The break-even point will
be determined by the number of long trips where the consumer costs in the first
period for GV and EV are equalized. In the second period, the threshold number
of long trips can increase due to stronger technological progress for EVs. The
equilibrium is influenced by the exogenous policy interventions.
The easiest way to determine, for a given set of policy parameters, the threshold
number of long trips lo, is to use lo as a control variable and to check the slope
of total cost functions as a function of the number of long trips l.
Taking the derivative of the total annual cost for the m-th EV user, CE(m),
yields the following expression:
∂CE(m)
∂lm
= (dl− ds)tEd + (B− ds · e)ppeak + (pch + z−P P · qEt )(dl · e−B) (1.22)
where the first term represents the additional distance charge for one extra day
with a long trip, (B − ds · e)ppeak represents the lost opportunity of storage and
(pch + z−P P · qEt )(dl · e−B) represents the total cost of charging en-route. This
expression is constant and the slope will be higher for a small battery car than
for a large battery car.
Taking the derivative of the total annual cost for the m-th GV user, CG(m),
yields the following expression:
∂CG(m)
∂lm
= (dl − ds)
[
f · vg + tGd
]
(1.23)







return scalars, we know that CE(m) and CG(m) are
linear in lm.
We can represent the car market equilibrium graphically. In the graph A repre-
0 lo 365
PE + τE − A
PG + τG
PE + τE
lm days with long trips
CG(m)
CE(m)
Figure 1.2: Illustration of user equilibrium mechanism for one period
sents the following formula:
A = 365(B − ds · e)(ppeak − poff ) (1.24)
which is the annual benefit of selling stored battery electricity during the peak.
If lm = 0, then all trips are short and every day the vehicle user can sell excess
electricity to the grid. From this graph, it is clear that for lm < l
o users prefer
electric vehicles, and for lm > l
o users prefer gasoline vehicles.
1.5.2 Comparative statics
Equalizing CE(mo) = CG(mo), we can solve for lo
lo =
PE − PG + τE − τG + CHE + 365(Us − ds · UG)
(dl − ds)UG − (Ul − Us)
(1.25)
Consider first an increase in the battery capacity B. This has two benefits: it
decreases the costs of the long trips and allows to gain more storage credits on
short trip days. This would lead to more EVs: the slope of the CE(l) would
become flatter but it also increases the cost of an EV and this shifts the CE(l)
upwards such that the end result is undetermined.
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Lower costs for en route charging (denser network, faster charging) will of course







As EVs also can serve a storage function, lower costs of off-peak electricity (lower




Conversely, as we increase the price differential of peak and off-peak electricity,
the potential benefit to EV users of selling excess power increases.
We can also prove that to decrease emissions via more storage of renewable off-
peak electricity, we must increase lo. First, we find the total emissions from our
stylized vehicle model.
∆XV = XG −XE
= [lo · dl + (365− lo) · ds] · f · xclg − [lo(dl · e−B)− (365− lo)(B − ds · e)]xcle
(1.28)
When we differentiate with respect to lo we need to consider that, as we increase lo
we are increasing the number of EVs, and thereby EV emissions, while reducing




= (dl − ds) · (f · xclg − e · xcle ) (1.29)
Assuming that xclg > x
cl
e , the change in emissions depends on the fuel efficiency of
GVs and the energy efficiency of EVs. As long as e > f , emissions will decrease
as lo increases, which is the outcome we expect as the share of EVs increases.
1.5.3 Optimal policy
In the optimal case, we need to correct all externalities. There are 5 externalities
that need correction: the climate externality, the other external costs associated
to car use, the learning by doing externality for EV producers, the R&D pure
knowledge externality for EV batteries and GV fuel efficiency, and the network
externality of the charging stations.
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This requires at least 5 instruments: a tax per unit of carbon emitted, a tax to
correct for the other externalities, a subsidy to pay for the external pure R&D
externalities, a subsidy to correct for the learning by doing externalities, and a
subsidy for the network externalities in the EV recharging network.
We can solve for the optimal amount of government funded R&D σ and the
optimal EV tax (or subsidy) ν to correct the knowledge spillovers, when we
set the first order conditions for profit maximization equal between the market
correcting and market optimal scenarios. In this way, we have for electric vehicles:
σ = 1− ρ
ν1 = (1− ρ)δn2GK(K2, qE2 )KH(H2, Q2)
(1.30)
We have similar results for the optimal level of R&D and learning subsidies. In
the first-best solution, the government subsidizes R&D to compensate the share
of knowledge that is not retained by the firm. The production subsidy in the
first period is equal to the lost benefits of first period learning that affect second
period production.
To correct for the other externalities we need distance taxes that cover the other
externalities (noise, non-carbon emissions, congestion, and accidents) as well as
a carbon tax. In this way, tGd = y
G





Building the model, it is clear that electric vehicle production depends on pro-
duction costs, the cost of R&D, and the share of retained knowledge. Gasoline
vehicle production depends on GV vehicle production tax and sales tax, as well
as on the possibilities to bring down the fuel efficiency costs via knowledge build
up that is for GVs limited to the R&D route only. Consumer demand depends on
the vehicle purchase price, annual ownership tax, vehicle emissions, usage fees,
and ease of use.
1.5.4 Selected policies for simulation
We will concentrate the policy analysis on 2 alternative policies:
Tradable portfolio mandate: One can oblige the car retail sector to sell a min-
imum market share of EVs. The best way to operationalize this measure is to
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use portfolio credits where the GV producers have to buy credits from the EV
manufacturers.
Maximum tradable carbon emissions rate or minimum tradable fuel efficiency
rate: An upper limit on the carbon emissions rate puts pressure on GV producers
to reduce the emissions intensity of their vehicles. As EVs have zero emissions by
definition, GV producers can pay EV producers to achieve the required emission
rate
Both policies include Subsidized charging stations : Subsidizing charging stations
increases the frequency and dispersion of en-route charging opportunities, effec-
tively extending the driving range for EVs. By expanding the driving area range,
a larger cross-section of consumers is interested in driving EVs.
We will also experiment with a Tax on GV purchase or Subsidy for EVs : this
policy is used widely to promote the use of a cleaner vehicle technology. As total
car ownership is given, a tax on GV purchase has the same effect as a subsidy
for EVs.
The common objective of all the policies is to achieve the same reduction in the
average carbon emission rate of new cars, where the carbon emission rate for EV
is taken to be 0. This decrease in the average carbon emission rate is decided
exogenously at the EU level. Finally, recall that in this model the mileage and car
ownership are fixed, so that rebound effects of more efficient cars are neglected.
1.6 Calibration of the numerical model
1.6.1 Focus of the model
We calibrate the model to Germany. We are interested in European policy
assessment, but as Europe only sets the broad policy options, it is better to
look into one concrete country with its actual policies rather than to examine
an average of policy measures over EU countries. But as we analyze the effect
of the broad European policy options, we assume that the car manufacturers
respond to the simulated policies at the European market scale when they decide
on production and R&D investments, so the policy options we discuss are, by
assumption, common to all member countries. We consider only two types of
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cars: gasoline cars and battery electric cars. We leave out the diesel cars as it is
not clear whether the latest generations of diesel cars (EURO 6) do, in general,
comply with the emissions standards for conventional pollution (NOx) and may,
therefore, be banned in more and more areas (ICCT, 2018). We also leave out
the plug-in electric vehicles (PHEV). Hybrid technology may be interesting but
up to now it is difficult to monitor to what extent they are effectively used in
electricity engine mode and not in fossil engine mode.
We build a two-period model, where the first period of 5 years can be understood
as covering the target year 2021 and a second period of 10 years where the
target year is 2030. The present EU policy target for 2021 is a fuel efficiency of
minimum 95 g CO2 or 4,1 L/100 vehicle-km (vkm) (tank to wheel and NEDC test
procedure) and for 2030 the target is a reduction of another 37,5% to reach 59
g CO2 (or 2,56 L/100 vkm). The EC allows trading of carbon efficiency credits,
the so-called “pooling” and “trading“ schemes (EC, 2017a).
1.6.2 Calibration challenges
Dealing with new technologies is inherently difficult for several reasons. First,
there is the uncertainty on the costs of future technologies. Second, the present
prices may already be set strategically in the sense of selling more in order to
benefit from the learning by doing mechanism. Third, the car market is a monop-
olistic competition market. We neglect the monopolistic feature of the market
by assuming perfect competition as this allows us to analyze more carefully other
mechanisms like technological progress. We return to this assumption later.
We proceed in the following way. We start by recalling the empirical basis of
car consumers and producers in the EU. Next, we calibrate the model to the
Norwegian policy experience that achieved a 30% market share for new cars in
2017 using a 100% purchase tax on GVs. This is the only case where EVs achieved
a large market share up to now. In a final step, we look into the estimates of
the cost development of new technologies. We conclude with a set of parameter
estimates that will be used in the policy analysis.
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1.6.3 Empirical basis for the EU passenger car market
A crucial assumption for the choice between fossil fuel and electric cars is the
trade-off between purchase costs and fuel costs. For an accurate characteriza-
tion of the trade-off, we rely on Grigolon, Reynaert, and Verboven (2018) who
estimated a supply and demand model for the EU car market exploiting the
differences across EU countries in fuel costs and purchase costs for gasoline and
diesel cars and including the monopolistic competition features of the car market.
They found that consumers are not systematically myopic in their car purchase
decisions. Their central estimate is a discount rate of 5,7% for a vehicle lifetime
of 10 years8. This is the estimate we will use in the model.
A second empirical insight we will use is the explanation given by Reynaert (2020)
for the gap between the current fuel efficiency of cars and the fuel efficiency
standard imposed by the European Commission. As car manufacturers were
not fined for the fuel efficiency gap, they offer vehicles with a fuel efficiency
that minimizes the sum of total user costs and purchase costs. The gap of 20%
to 40% in the fuel efficiency achievements becomes then a rational response of
the car manufacturers. This implies that, for the consumer, the possible fuel
expenditure savings of 1 liter of gasoline per 100 vkm, or 225 e per year (15.000
km/year, price of fuel 1,5 e/liter), are smaller than the manufacturing cost of
making a car that is 1 liter per 100km more efficient. This implies that the cost
of increasing the fuel efficiency by 1 liter per 100 vkm has to be larger than the
discounted value of fuel savings for 10 years at 5,7% interest rate so larger than
1679 e extra per vehicle.
In this model the mileage for each type of trip is kept constant. This raises a
problem when through fuel efficiency improvements for GVs and the switch of GV
to EV, the variable costs decrease as the rebound effect can become important.
As we focus on the choice between two car technologies, we decided to only take
into account the effect of the changes in the variable costs on the selection of
the two car technologies. The disadvantage of EVs for long trips is taken into
account by the subjective costs of refueling of EVs. However, we also need to
take into account the low variable cost advantage of EVs for short trips. We
therefore include for the EVs an extra consumer surplus in the form of a lower
8See Table 3, model I in Grigolon, Reynaert, and Verboven (2018). If one uses a longer
lifetime, one needs to adjust the discount rate downwards
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user cost for the difference in variable costs between GVs and EVs. But we also
include in the welfare cost an additional external congestion cost for short trips
as these are mostly in urban areas.
1.6.4 Fuel efficiency costs and technical progress
We can compare two approaches: one is the technical cost curve using engineering
estimates and the other is the revealed preference approach using market data.
The EC (2017a) produced technical cost estimates for fuel efficiency improve-
ment of 15% in 2025 and of 30% in 2030. The results (expressed as additional
manufacturing costs) are summarized in Table 1.2.





Absolute values (e) 400 - 500 1000 - 1200
Increase in vehicle
cost
1,5 - 3% 4,5 - 6,5%
Assuming rational consumers and the non-compliance we found for the EU fuel
efficiency standards, the additional cost is larger than 360 e per year to improve
the fuel efficiency of the car from 5,6 L/100 vkm to 4,1 L /100 vkm. We estimate
it to be 2686 e9 per car otherwise the manufacturers would have complied with
the standard. We add 50% to this cost of fuel efficiency improvements and use
then 540 e as the additional yearly cost to comply with the emission standard for
2021 (from 5,6 to 4,1 L/100 vkm) and 2804 e additional yearly cost to achieve
the standard for 2030 (from 5,6 to 2,56 L/100 vkm). Both cost estimates assume
there is no specific R&D effort to bring these costs further down.
Comparing Tables 1.2 and 1.3, the “revealed preference estimates” from the
car market are an order of magnitude larger than the engineering estimates.
According to Gillingham and Stock (2012) this is not uncommon and is partly
a matter of concept. We will use the high revealed preference estimate as this is
consistent with the rational behavior of consumers and manufacturers that we
9The consumer saves 225 e per year if fuel costs 1,5 e/L and he drives 15.000 km/year. So
improving the fuel efficiency from 5,6 to 4 will cost 1,6 (225) or 360 e on a yearly basis and
using a discount rate of 5,7% for 10 years produces a car cost increase of 2686 e.
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Table 1.3: Revealed preference estimates of fuel efficiency costs
Present
realization
2021 standard 2030 standard
Emission
standard













assume. We will return to this assumption later.
1.6.5 Costs and technical progress in batteries
There are several estimates about future battery costs. Figure 1.3 summarizes
the estimates of the U.S. Department of Energy (U.S. DOE, 2017) from the
OECD/IEA (2017) Global EV Outlook for the progress in costs for a battery
pack designed to deliver 320 km range. For sufficiently large battery volumes
(production of 200.000 batteries per year), the price of batteries could decrease
to 200 $/kWh. Batteries in a 60 kWh car represent up to 40% of the costs
Global EV outlook 2017 © OECD/IEA 2017 
Two million and counting 
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The 2016 cost and energy density assessment draws from the results developed by the US DOE (Howell, 
2017). The assessment aims to reflect the production cost of technologies that are currently being 
researched once they achieve commercial-scale, high-volume production (US DOE, 2017). The US DOE 
estimate is higher than the USD 180/kWh to USD 200/kWh range of battery pack costs announced recently 
by GM and LG Chem (Ayre, 2015) or Tesla and Panasonic (Field, 2016; Lambert, 2016a, 2016b) for batteries 
that will be used in new EV models. The estimates are also lower than the costs estimates for commercially 
available technologies reported in other assessments, which range between USD 300/kWh (Slowik et al., 
2016) an  USD 500/kWh (US DOE, 2017). Overall, this confirms that technologies curr ntly in the R&D 
stage have better performance than those available on the market. Since the cost estimates for the scale-
up f lab-scale technologies are proj ctions of the expected costs in three to five years for high-volume 
production (US DOE, 2017),12 the assessment suggests that battery costs will continue to decline. 
Figure 6 • Evolution of battery energy density and cost 
Notes: Contrary to the results assessed for 2009-15, which targeted PHEV batteries, the 2016 estimates of costs and volumetric 
energy density by the US DOE (costs are to be interpreted as projections for the high-volume production of technologies currently 
being researched) refer to a battery pack that is designed to deliver 320 km of all-electric range and is, therefore, suitable for BEVs. 
The latest update of this cost assessment was developed accounting for an advanced lithium-ion technology (with silicon alloy-
composite anode). Being a technology that is still being researched today, this is currently deemed to have a greater cost but also a 
larger potential for cost reductions compared with conventional lithium-ion technologies. 
Sources: Howell (2017), EV Obsession (2015) and Cobb (2015a). 
Key point: Prospects for future cost reductions from the main families of battery technologies confirm the encouraging 
signs in cost and performance improvements observed over the past decade. 
Expansions in production volumes and pack size bear the capacity to reduce unit costs (Howell, 2017). 
According to the US DOE, increasing production volumes from 25 000 units to 100 000 units for a BEV 
(100 kWh) battery pack allows a cut in battery pack production costs per kWh by 13%. Other studies 
confirm that production volume is a key factor in battery pack cost reduction: battery pack production 
volumes of over 200 000 battery packs per year are estimated to cost USD 200/kWh or less. This is roughly 
one-third lower than the USD 300/kWh estimated for production volumes ranging between 10 000 and 
30 000 units in 2015 (Slowik et al., 2016). 
Increasing the pack size from 60 kWh to 100 kWh (roughly reflecting, in the case of an average car sold in 
the United States, an increase in range from 200 km to 320 km) would also lead to a 17% reduction in cost 
per kWh at the pack level (Howell, 2017). 
12 Looking at the historical assessment of technologies being researched (Figure 6) against the costs estimated for 
commercially available applications today also suggests that lab-scale technologies tend to be three to five years ahead when 




















































US DOE battery cost (BEV)
US DOE battery cost (PHEV)
Cost claimed by GM and Tesla (BEV)
GM battery cost target (BEV)
Tesla battery cost target (BEV)
US DOE battery cost target (PHEV)
US DOE energy density (PHEV)
US DOE energy density (BEV)
US DOE energy density target (PHEV)
Figure 1.3: Estimates of progress in battery costs
of an EV (Kochhan e al. (2017) and OECD/IEA (2017)). For an electric car
with a 30 kWh battery, the purchase cost (before taxes and subsidies) is around
36.000 e (EAMA, 2019). This is in the range of prices we find on the European
market. The total EV price is decomposed into a 9.000 e cost for the battery
(300 e/kWh) and a 27.000 e cost for the rest of the car.
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For GVs we use a consumer price of 26.110 e for a car that has a fuel efficiency
of 5,6 L/100km (EAMA, 2019).
1.6.6 A calibration test with the Norway experience
It is difficult to calibrate a model with a new type of vehicle when this new type
has a market share of only 1 or 2% in most EU countries. For this reason, we
calibrate the model, using the experience in Norway, (more precisely the greater
Oslo area) that achieved a 30% penetration of EVs in the new car market in
2017 (Haugneland et al., 2017). Of course, this is a very rough approach but it
can be justified for the stylized model we use here. Norway achieved this result
using a wide set of policies (see Wangsness et al. (2020)). We focus on two of the
policy parameters: a purchase tax for fossil cars of 100% and a dense refueling
network for EVs. When we use our dynamic two period model, we also have
to specify the policy goals and instruments for the second period. Norway has
announced to ban fossil fuel cars in 2025. However, it is not clear whether the
car manufacturers will adapt their R&D and whether economics of scale and
learning by doing will really be set in action to make this happen as Norway is
a small country. Setting on hold the technical progress, the model is calibrated
by an additional cost constant for EVs such that the 100% purchase tax on GVs
achieves indeed the 30% penetration of EVs in the first period. In Norway the
price of electricity is uniform so vehicle to grid (V2G) operations play no role in
this calibration.
1.6.7 Other calibration parameters
The full list of parameter values are given in A.1. Here we discuss a few assump-
tions.
First, we use a triangular distribution of long trips days between 20 and 100 long
trip days per year. On short trip days (365 days – number of long days), cars
drive 10 km and on long trip days they drive 350 km. This gives the average
mileage of 14.000 km per year in Germany (based on Pasaoglu et al. (2012)).
The second assumption that merits attention are the peak and off-peak prices
of electricity. In many European countries there are not yet peak and off-peak
differentiated prices. When the European power sector will be largely renewable,
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there will be a need for prices that are differentiated between periods with enough
wind and solar energy (off-peak) and the other periods (peak). Prices in the off-
peak will be low (0,15 e/kWh) but not zero as there are other uses of electricity
in off-peak periods. In the peak period we use a value of 0,30 e/kWh that
corresponds to the price of generation power with a peaking gas plant during
a few hundred hours a year.10 Charging an EV can also raise balancing and
distribution network issues when it is not coordinated. This is the reason why
we use a high price per kWh (0,60 e/kWh) for charging en-route.
1.6.8 Choice of model parameters on technical progress
One of the uncertainties relates to the effects of knowledge building on the costs
of the two types of cars. We use the following five assumptions:
First, EVs and GVs have many components in common and technological progress
is important for all kinds of functionalities of a vehicle. This means that we are
not interested in technological progress regarding safety, entertainment, suspen-
sion, self-driving cars, etc. So, for GVs we only consider the additional costs
related to improving the fuel efficiency. For EVs, we consider only the costs of
batteries.
The second assumption relates to the initial stock of knowledge for both types
of cars and the modelling of the learning by doing component of the knowledge
building. The problem is that for EVs, one starts with a small initial production
(1 or 2% of car market) and one can argue that there are learning and possible
scale effects in the production and the marketing of EVs. For GVs, there is a
long history of mass scale production and they have already a dominant market
share. So, it is difficult to argue that there are important learning by doing
effects for GVs, even if they are specific to the fuel efficiency related component.
For this reason, we only kept the learning by doing component for the knowledge
building in the battery costs of EVs.
The third assumption relates to the production of knowledge by pure R&D. Is
there a reason to have another cost function for R&D for EVs than for GVs? Of
course, there is more experience with GVs but labs and universities have studied
10On-peak and off-peak prices are based on electricity prices for households in Germany
(Eurostat, 2020a).
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electric cars for many years and there are trained scientists for both technolo-
gies. So, we assumed the same cost function for R&D for both technologies. In
addition, we assume that both types of R&D do not crowd out each other, they
call upon a different pool of engineering knowledge.
The fourth assumption relates to the initial stock of knowledge for both tech-
nologies. Our formulation is based on the ratio of new knowledge versus existing
knowledge (K2/K1). We set the initial knowledge base for both technologies
equal to 1. In Table 1.4, we illustrate the effects of the two types of learning on
the battery costs of EVs and on the fuel efficiency costs of GVs. The coefficients
used for the technical progress are ηQ = ηH = 0,15 for both EVs and GVs, where
the mechanism for cost reduction is given in Equations 1.11 and 1.17 .














For GVs, we only have knowledge building by R&D as the GV market is a more
mature market.
A final parameter that needs to be calibrated is the cost of pure R&D. We know
that there is a large R&D investment in the European automobile sector. In
2016, the top 2.500 companies in the “Automobiles and parts” sector invested
some 55 billion e in R&D (Tagliapietra and Zachmann, 2018), part of which was
for the power trains. If we can assume that half of the total R&D investment is
related to power trains and using a total EU car production of 17 million vehicles
(EAMA, 2019), this would mean an investment for R&D per car of the order of
3.235 e. Translated into annual equivalent investments per car (annuity factor
of 7,466), this is 433,3 e/car.
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1.7 Policy simulations
Our central research question is: what is the cost of reducing carbon emissions
in the car sector and how is this cost related to the choice of policy instruments.
We emphasize the role of the choice of policies on the induced technical progress.
As mileages and car ownership are fixed, reducing CO2 emissions implies moving
to a combination of more fuel efficient gasoline cars and electric cars. More
particularly, we take as given the EU objective to reduce average CO2 emissions
of new cars to 95 g/vkm (or 4,1 liter gasoline/vkm) over a period of 5 years and
a reduction to 59 g/vkm (or 2,56 liter gasoline /vkm) after 15 years. Figure 1.4
100% EV0% EV 54% EV
Marginal cost (2nd 
period) of increasing 
market share of EV
Marginal cost (2nd period) 
of increasing share of GV 















Share of electric vehicles
Figure 1.4: Marginal cost of market shares to achieve emissions target
gives the intuition of the results to be expected from the policy simulations. This
figure measures from left to right the share of EVs and the social marginal cost
(EV line) in the second period of achieving the policy objective via an increase
in the share of EVs. This cost is upward sloping because, for given technology
and battery size, an EV has a handicap for substituting longer trips. When
there is no technological progress for EVs and GVs do not improve their fuel
efficiency, we need to reach point A where the share of EVs equals 54%. This
share is needed to reach the required average carbon efficiency in period 2.11 Now
introduce the option for GVs to improve their fuel efficiency but still rule out
technological progress. The marginal cost of increasing the share of GV beyond
46% consists in increasing the fuel efficiency and is measured from right to left
starting at the axis 54%. This gives a new optimum point B. Introduce now
11(0, 457)(5, 6L/100km) + (0, 543)(0L/100km) = 2, 56L/100km
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technological progress for EVs and GVs that is produced by learning by doing
and R&D in the first period. In Figure 1.4 this means that both marginal cost
curves decrease and one ends up in point C. This represents the vehicle mix that
minimizes the cost of achieving the carbon efficiency objective.
1.7.1 The role of induced technological progress
Table 1.5 compares the efficiency of the carbon emission standard (ES) and EV
portfolio mandate (PM) in reaching the common policy goal in each period.
The common policy goal is to reduce emissions of cars from the current 110 g
CO2/vehicle-kilometer (vkm) to 59 g CO2/vkm after 15 years (end of period
2) with an intermediate target of 95 g CO2/vkm after 5 years (end of period
1). We will use the improvement of the gasoline fuel efficiency from the current
0,056 L/vkm to 0,041 L/vkm (after 5 years) and 0,0256 L/vkm after 15 years
as equivalent units for emission reduction. Overall results in terms of average
























































Figure 1.5: Average welfare costs to achieve the period 2 emissions target
is the portfolio mandate where the targets have to be met by increasing the
market share of EVs that have zero emissions. We assume here that the GVs
keep their current fuel efficiency level of 0,056 liter/ vkm.12 This implies that the
EVs have to reach a market share of 27% at end of period 1 and a market share
of 54% at the end of period 2. The GV producers have no incentive to improve
the fuel efficiency as the policy instrument requires them only to contribute to
12We assume that GV producers do not decrease the fuel efficiency of their cars. In our model
simulations, we keep the gasoline tax unchanged so that they have no incentive to change the
initial fuel efficiency level.
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the EV market share by buying portfolio credits from the EV producers. If
all car producers produce both GVs and EVs, the portfolio mandate could also
be achieved with a cross-subsidy for the production of EVs. In the absence of
induced technological progress (Column 1) we see that in the first period, the
GV producers have to pay 886 e13 for every EV, so per GV this is 328 e on an
annual basis. In the second period, the share of EVs needs to be higher, as EVs
have a higher user cost for longer trips, they need a lower purchase price and this
requires a higher portfolio credit for the EVs (1764 e). Together with the lower
market share of GVs, this results in an increase of the purchase cost of GVs on
an annuity basis of 2070 e per gasoline vehicle.
The purchase cost of EVs is but one of the elements in the user cost equilibrium
(cfr. Section 1.5.1) as also the fuel costs, the V2G benefits, and the endogenous
refueling network density play a role. Column 1 further reports the fuel efficiency
for GVs in period 1 and period 2, as well as the battery cost reduction (0 as there
is, by assumption, no technological progress). The table reports the total cost
index as well as the % reduction in CO2 emissions and the average cost of emission
reduction per tonne of CO2 that is high (226 e). To put this cost in perspective,
it can be compared with the current gasoline tax (0,68 e /L) that comes down
to 293 e / tonne of CO2.14 The 293 e/ tonne means that for a gasoline car
producer, making his car more fuel efficient so that it reduces emissions by 1
tonne, would increase the manufacturing cost by 293 e. Replacing part of the
GVs by EVs would save emissions at a lower cost: 165 e per tonne because EVs
have very low emissions. This average cost of emission reduction is computed in
welfare terms taking into account the differences in other external costs between
the two types of vehicles. An EV has an advantage over GVs in terms of air
pollution and noise for short trips (mainly in urban areas) as well as the benefits
of V2G.
Although the reduction of the average emission per car is the policy target and
is the same for all scenarios, there will be differences in CO2 emissions. A higher
share of EVs decreases the total emissions more than proportionally because the
EVs are used for more and more long trips.
13This is an annual equivalent; this means that the EVs receive a credit of 6610 e per car
produced.
14We take the gasoline cost and tax for Germany from OECD (2016a) and OECD (2016b).
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Market share EV 1 27% 27% 1% 1%
Market share EV 2 27% 27% 1% 9%
Price EV 1 (e) 3940 3944 4720 4736
Price EV 2 (e) 3062 2528 4754 3484
Price GV 1 (e) 3827 3828 4026 3837
Price GV 2 (e) 5570 4826 3693 4222
Fuel eff 1 (L/vkm) 0,056 0,056 0,04088 0,0449
Fuel eff 2 (L/vkm) 0,056 0,056 0,04088 0,0288
Battery cost reduction 0% 97% 0% 97%
Total cost index 100
(=211)
97 102 82
e/tonne CO2 saved 226 199 186 100








PM = Portfolio Mandate ES = Emissions Standard
We can now introduce the effects of technological progress. In the case of the
portfolio mandate, the technological progress is limited to the EVs because the
fuel efficiency of the GVs does not matter for meeting the portfolio standard.
The producers of EVs benefit from the two mechanisms to reduce the costs of
EV batteries. First, they realize that producing a larger quantity and selling
below the marginal cost in the first period (cfr. Equation 1.18) decreases their
production cost in the second period, part of this cost reduction spills over to
the rest of the industry but there remains a clear incentive to produce more
and achieve a stronger learning by doing effect. When the market share of
EVs increases in the first period to 27%, there is a significant learning by doing
effect. The second mechanism that is activated by the EV producers is the pure
knowledge build up about battery production that requires firms to invest in
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R&D. EV producers invest nearly 10% of their income in the first period in pure
R&D. This allows them to reduce the cost of batteries by 97%. This does not
increase the share of EVs because the EV-share is determined by the binding
portfolio obligation. But the technological progress reduces the costs of meeting
the target and the costs per tonne of CO2 saved is reduced to 199 e/ tonne of
CO2.
Next, we analyze the carbon or fuel emissions standard that forces car producers
to achieve a lower average emission rate in the first period and an even lower
emission rate in the second period. The incentives for the GV producers are
now different. They have to meet the average emission rate. They can do this
by making their cars more efficient and also by buying carbon efficiency credits
from EV producers. They will balance the two options so as to minimize their
overall production costs. When technological progress is excluded, this forces the
GV producers to make more efficient GVs (0,0488 L/vkm) but this is expensive
and increases the production cost of GVs (annual equivalent) to 4025 e. They
need to complement this effort with carbon efficiency credits they buy from EV
producers. In the second period, reaching the fuel efficiency target becomes very
expensive for the GV producers and they have to mainly rely on purchasing fuel
efficiency permits from the EV producers. In the end, this solution produces
slightly less CO2 emission reduction: there are less EVs but the GVs are more
fuel efficient. CO2 emissions are also reduced at slightly lower cost than in the
case of the portfolio mandate, all this in the absence of technological progress.
Introduce now technological progress: we have learning by doing and pure knowl-
edge build up for EVs and for GVs but we only take into account the pure knowl-
edge build up. With the carbon emissions standard, the GV producers have a
strong incentive to reduce the cost of fuel efficiency improvement via R&D ex-
penditures as the cost of reaching the target in the second period is very high.
The investments in R&D allow them to improve the fuel efficiency from 0,056
L/vkm (starting value) to 0,0288 L/vkm after 15 years. For the last bit (to
reach the target 0,0254 L/vkm), they rely on carbon efficiency credits of EVs.
The share of EVs in the second period is lowest in this scenario.
The most important advantage of this policy scenario is the lower cost of reducing
CO2 emissions. Total emission reductions are somewhat lower than in the other
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scenarios (51% in the second period rather than 64%) but the overall cost of the
scenario is much lower and so is the cost per tonne of CO2 saved that becomes 100
e/tonne CO2. The main reason is that the option to improve the fuel efficiency of
GV has become interesting for GV producers so that they will invest in bringing
down the cost of fuel efficiency improvements.
Figure 1.5 summarizes our results in terms of average costs of CO2 emission
reduction. This figure adds the EV purchase subsidy (or GV tax) case that
has the same average cost as a portfolio mandate because, in our model, the
car ownership is fixed and there is no penalty for the use of public funds. The
“Norway” scenario that achieves the 30% penetration of EV with a purchase tax
on fossil cars performs worse as an action by one isolated country is unlikely to
stimulate technological progress.
A portfolio mandate forcing a bigger market share for EVs is currently discussed
by several governments: Norway wants to ban fossil cars by 2025, France and the
UK have announced plans to ban the sales of fossil cars by 2040 and some big
cities (Paris) also want to ban fossil cars by 2030. According to our analysis, this
is a costly policy at the aggregate level. The high cost results from neglecting
the option to make gasoline cars more fuel efficient.
1.7.2 The importance of battery size and V2G
Up to now we assumed a standard battery size of 30 kWh in all scenarios. The
optimal battery size depends on the importance of the V2G benefits and on the
number of long trips. A larger battery is more expensive but allows to store
and sell more electricity on days with short trips and allows to lose less time for
refueling during long trips (see Greaker, Hagem, and Proost (2019)). In principle,
one needs to choose an optimal battery size for their annual number of long trip
days, so the optimal battery size would be different for every individual.15
We only used one size of batteries in all the simulations: 30 kWh. When we vary
the size of the battery (see Table 1.6) we find that the cost of emission reduction
decreases but that the market share of EVs is not strongly affected.
15One could also argue that the optimal fuel efficiency is different for every individual as not
all individuals drive the same distance.
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Table 1.6: Effect of battery size on cost of saved CO2 (e/tonne CO2)








The V2G option was embedded in all simulations and is driven by the difference
between peak and off-peak electricity prices. When we use uniform electricity
prices, the V2G option is no longer interesting for the EV owners and there is no
transfer anymore from off-peak to peak periods. Table 1.7 shows that this will
increase the cost of reducing CO2 emissions mainly in the portfolio scenario as
in this scenario the EV market share is highest.
Table 1.7: Role of V2G for period 2 emissions reduction and cost















Porfolio mandate 151 78 192 64
Carbon emissions standard 82 51 100 51
The high share of EVs in the portfolio mandate also enables a significant increase
in the CO2 emissions savings in the second period. Turning the V2G option on
or off has almost no effect on the market share of EVs because this share is
mainly dictated by the average fuel efficiency target. Figure 1.6 illustrates effect
of battery size and V2G on CO2 emissions reductions in period 2 and the average




































































Figure 1.6: Average cost of emission reduction varying battery size and V2G
1.8 Caveats
1.8.1 Model assumptions
We used a simple model that is missing some important dimensions. First, it
focuses on the sales of new cars and takes the mileage and lifetime of cars as
fixed. This may overestimate the savings of fuel and CO2 emissions as there will
be a rebound effect when the variable cost of driving becomes much smaller. On
the other hand, more fuel-efficient cars, electric or not, will be more expensive
and this may decrease car ownership and prolong the life of cars.
Second, we assumed rational car consumers and producers. If car consumers
would be myopic as advanced by the EC (2017b) this would imply that the cur-
rent car market equilibrium offers cheap opportunities to improve fuel efficiency.
This is in line with the low engineering estimates of the costs of improving fuel
efficiency (cfr. Table 1.1). Then imposing fuel efficiency targets becomes the
primary policy instrument as the high gasoline tax would not do its job properly.
In terms of instrument choice, the automobile industry has to comply with the
fuel efficiency standard but faces consumers that are biased against high initial
vehicle costs, so against EVs. This normally gives rise to an equilibrium with a
higher share of more efficient gasoline cars.
Third, we assumed perfect competition in the car market although the car market
is characterized by monopolistic competition. Introducing the fuel efficiency
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regulation implies that R&D expenditures will increase fixed costs and more
fuel-efficient cars will also imply a higher variable cost. Higher vehicle costs force
manufacturers to increase prices and this leads to lower diversity in the supply
of cars. But our model has fixed car ownership, so introducing monopolistic
competition would not give a very different result.
1.8.2 Commitment issues
In the two-period model, the endogenous technological progress is driven by the
possibilities to decrease the costs of meeting the stricter targets in the second
period. The R&D investments have to be made in the first period and firms will
only make these investments when they are sure that the government commits to
the strict targets. The experience with fuel efficiency targets in the EU shows that
imposing strict targets is not sufficient: car manufacturers did not comply and
only delivered the fuel efficiency level justified by the present gasoline price. The
commitment and enforcement problem also appeared for conventional emissions
of diesel cars (“diesel-gate”). When there is no strict monitoring and strong
sanctioning, the GV producers will simply select the fuel efficiency that minimizes
the full user costs of GV owners, the fuel efficiency will not improve, and the
EVs will barely enter the market. Table 1.5 illustrates that, in the absence
of technological progress, meeting the targets becomes very costly. This could
happen when automobile firms do not believe the commitment of the government
and do not invest in R&D.
Yao (1988) studied the emission regulation of cars in the US in the early seventies.
The US government did not know the efficiency of investments in R&D, though
the industry knew or had at least less uncertainty about the costs. In a multi-
period model, the industry association is afraid of revealing its R&D productivity
in the first period as it risks the ratchet effect. Government may in this case
impose an even stricter target in the second period. So, the industry may very
well choose a strategy where it underinvests in R&D and shows high costs of
meeting the target in the first period hoping that the government will set more
lax targets. This story has been repeated in California regarding the portfolio
mandate imposing a minimum share of zero emission cars.
The problem is solved when the government can commit itself for a long period.
This is difficult as a new government can easily change the law. Perhaps the best
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guarantee for commitment by the EU is a good cost benefit analysis showing that
the costs of the regulation are in line with the benefits. In the current assessment
of the fuel efficiency standards (EC, 2017a), there are two weak points. First,
the use of engineering estimates are much lower than the revealed cost estimates.
Second, the climate objectives of the EU may not be shared by the rest of the
world and mechanisms like the green paradox decrease the credibility of the fuel
efficiency targets.
1.8.3 Federal and international coordination
The fuel efficiency targets we analyzed here are set at the level of the European
market for new cars. This gives a lot of flexibility for the car manufacturers
but has strong implications for the individual member states. Some cities and
member states want to set themselves a minimum share of EVs or want to set
a tougher fuel efficiency target for cars. The net effect of these uncoordinated
policies could be null. As the car manufacturers have to meet a European wide
average, when one member state is more ambitious, the manufacturers can reduce
their efforts in the rest of the federation. This mechanism was demonstrated in
the USA where 14 states did set more ambitious targets for greenhouse gases (the
so called “Pavley” limits). Goulder, Jacobson, and van Benthem (2012) showed
that 74% to 65% of the efforts leaked away at the federal level. I will revisit this
mechanism in Chapter 2.
The model we analyzed focused on the EU carbon policy. However, the climate
problem is a world problem where the role of EU emissions is decreasing as its
emissions will approach 10% of total emissions. EU efforts can have a positive
and a negative spillover outside the EU. The positive spillover can come from the
transfer of fuel efficiency technology to the rest of the world. Car manufacturers
in the rest of the world will be forced to adopt the same efficiency standards
if they want to sell cars in the EU (Barla and Proost, 2012). The negative
spillover of the EU fuel efficiency efforts can come from the green paradox as fuel




In this chapter, we used a two-period model for the car manufacturing sector with
gasoline car producers and electric car producers to compare the cost efficiency of
different policies to decrease the CO2 emissions of cars. Both types of cars have
endogenous technological progress that is triggered by environmental policies,
including tradable fuel efficiency standards, portfolio mandates, carbon taxes,
purchase taxes, and subsidies for R&D. Electric vehicles can also be used for
vehicle to grid operations where off peak (renewable) electricity can be stored in
the battery to reduce the load in the peak hours.
The current EU policy instrument is a tradable carbon emissions standard where
gasoline fueled cars can improve their fuel efficiency and can purchase carbon ef-
ficiency credits from EV producers as EVs are considered as zero-emission cars.
We show that this instrument outperforms the portfolio mandate where the same
reduction of the average emission rate is obtained with lower costs. The carbon
emissions standard is better because it contains an incentive to improve the fuel
efficiency of GVs through R&D. The carbon emissions standard is dynamically
more efficient than a portfolio mandate that targets a high share of EVs. With
endogenous technological progress, the cost of saving CO2 emissions is reduced
to about 100 e/tonne CO2. However, these investments in technological progress
require that car producers consider the EU target as credible and a real com-
mitment. The EU fuel efficiency target for 2021 will very likely not be met
and this means that car producers may not take the current targets as a strong
commitment from the side of the policy makers.
We consider several potential model extensions. First, endogenizing congestion
and modeling car use as a function of price. In this way, the annual vehicle
mileage is no longer fixed and the rebound effects from V2G are more pro-
nounced. Because the aim of this chapter is to analyze emissions reductions
policy for five and ten year periods, daily price-dependent driving patterns fall
outside the scope of necessary variables for this analysis. Second, introducing
more heterogeneity in the vehicle options, such that there is a range of fuel ef-
ficiencies for GVs and a range of battery sizes for EVs. While this extension
adds more specificity to the model, the key insights will be similar. Third, ex-
panding the model to the international market and incorporating strategic trade
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and technology spillovers from multinational producers. As this extension asks
a separate question regarding the inner workings of the international EV market




Surpassing the EU Fuel Economy
Standard in Heavy Duty Freight
2.1 Introduction
Freight is a sleeping giant in the transport sector. Accounting for more than 35%
of all transport-related CO2 emissions, as of 2017, road freight vehicles were re-
sponsible for nearly half of global diesel demand (IEA, 2017a). In the European
Union, road freight demand has increased 400% since 1990, largely as a result of
economic growth and globalization. As a result of the high quality highway net-
works and advanced supply chain and logistics systems, Europe has the largest
fleet of road freight vehicles (IEA, 2017b). Without substantial policy interven-
tion, road freight is predicted to be a primary source of CO2 emissions growth
in the coming decades (Muncrief and Sharpe, 2015). To force fuel efficiency
improvement, in 2014, the EU composed a strategy to reduce carbon emissions
from heavy freight trucks by certifying, monitoring, and reporting emissions (EC,
2019c). To realize their strategy, the European Commission developed VECTO,
a simulation tool to determine CO2 emissions and fuel consumption data for new
trucks (EC, 2019c). In 2019, the EU set a concrete fuel economy standard for
heavy freight truck manufacturers to reduce the fleet-wide average emissions for
new trucks that they produce by 15% compared to 2019 levels starting in 2025
2.1. Introduction 53
and by 30% starting in 2030 (EC, 2019c). Some countries, such as Sweden, have
found this standard to be too lax and are actively developing stricter national
policies. This chapter addresses two research questions: how does one or more
member nations enacting a stricter fuel economy standard for heavy duty trucks
impact the emissions reduction behavior for the rest of the EU? Further, to what
extent is there carbon leakage and how does incongruous national and interna-
tional policy affect the total cost of achieving the EU fuel economy standard?
Heavy freight trucks account for 65% of all freight activity (Muncrief and Sharpe,
2015). The market for these trucks is highly consolidated with just four manu-
facturers (Daimler, VW Group, Volvo, and Renault-Nissan Alliance) producing
over 60% of the heavy freight trucks sold in the EU (IEA, 2017a). In this way,
most trucks used in the EU are also produced in the EU. Shipping companies
generate the demand for road freight and then contract out the individual deliv-
eries to trucking companies. These trucking companies generally operate small
truck fleets and maximize their profits by minimizing their costs of satisfying
shippers’ freight demands.
With time, reliability, and cost constraints, and no shortage of freight demand,
these trucking companies operate in a highly competitive market. It follows that
each company is motivated to reduce costs. Fuel represents around 25% of heavy
freight operating cost and there are many technologies on the market to improve
fuel efficiency (IEA, 2017a). There have been several regional policies to address
fuel efficiency, such as the Lean & Green forum to provide reliable information
about efficiency technologies to many EU countries, but none have stimulated
significant investment in heavy freight truck fuel efficiency (IEA, 2017a).
In this chapter, I use a two-period model for the heavy freight truck manufactur-
ing sector that produces low and high fuel efficiency trucks. Investment in R&D
can reduce the costs and improve the fuel efficiency of the high fuel efficiency
trucks. Demand for trucks is split between two regions: the member nations
adopting stricter fuel economy standards and the rest of the EU. There is per-
fect competition in the production sector, where each producer maximizes profits
by taking prices as given for new trucks and investing in fuel efficiency technolo-
gies subject to the fuel economy standard constraints. Based on the additional
emissions reductions in the stricter region, the rest of the EU countries increase
2.2. Literature review 54
their emissions, which I refer to as ‘leakage’ (compared to the scenario where all
member countries have the same emissions reduction target), such that the EU
standard is met at the lowest cost. I show that redistribution of carbon emissions
is an unavoidable result of incongruous national and international road freight
policy. This chapter reveals an inadvertent trade-off between a Bonus-Malus
feebate system and the producer investment in R&D.
The chapter is organized as follows: Section 2.2 provides a literature review,
Section 2.3 outlines the model structure, and Section 2.4 explains the solution
procedure. In Section 2.5, I delineate the data and calibration parameters re-
quired to solve the model and in Section 2.6, I analyze the policy impacts of each
scenario. In Section 2.7, I conclude.
2.2 Literature review
This chapter draws upon two strands of literature. The first is the relationship
between environmental policy and technological innovation, and the second is
economic losses and carbon leakage arising from nested regulation.
There is considerable literature on the theoretical role of endogenous technical
change in reducing the cost of achieving environmental policy (see Goulder and
Schneider (1999), van der Zwaan et al. (2002), Acemoglu et al. (2012)). Sev-
eral empirical studies affirm this theory. For instance, Calel and Dechezleprêtre
(2016) find evidence that the EU ETS increased low-carbon innovation in regu-
lated firms by 10%. I incorporate endogenous technical change using an approach
similar to Fischer and Newell (2008). They represent R&D for renewables in the
electricity sector by using a two-period model where investment in the first period
leads to lower marginal costs of renewables in the second period. While much of
this literature examines the effects of endogenous change on market-based poli-
cies (carbon taxes), I consider a performance standard, which is a second-best
policy. As second-best policies are generally more palatable in political discus-
sions, governments are more likely to implement them.
In his seminal work on the fiscal effects of nested regulation, Oates (1972) presents
his decentralization theorem that centralized policy is optimal when there are
inter-jurisdictional spillovers. Carbon emissions leakage is an example of an inter-
2.3. Building the model 55
jurisdictional spillover arising from incongruent national and international policy.
Oates’ work provides the foundation for a growing body of literature on carbon
leakage resulting from incongruent national and international climate change
policy (see Felder and Rutherford (1993), Barker et al. (2007), Perino, Ritz, and
van Benthem (2019)). Given the importance of transport in achieving climate
goals, there are several papers addressing the impact of nested policy in reducing
transport emissions. Eliasson and Proost (2015) examine the spatial and inter-
temporal consumption leakage that arise when international climate agreements
are not binding and only a subset of countries take action to reduce emissions
in the transport sector. Goulder, Jacobson, and van Benthem (2012) find that
carbon leakage resulting from nested state and federal fuel economy regulations
for passenger transport implies that the cost of avoided emissions is 50% higher
than in the case with a national policy (and therefore no carbon leakage). This
chapter builds upon the insights of these two papers. I aim to quantify the
orders of magnitude for carbon leakage, R&D investment, and the overall cost of
carbon saved in achieving the EU heavy duty freight fuel economy standards. A
key literary contribution of this chapter is to explain the mechanism underlying
the additional costs of incongruous national and international transport policy
and how these costs are distributed.
2.3 Building the model
2.3.1 Overview
The numerical simulation model from the Goulder, Jacobson, and van Benthem
(2012) paper on carbon leakage in the U.S. light-duty automobile market serves
as a template. In their model, production is a Bertrand competition among a
fixed number of producers. This requires the assumption that producers can sep-
arately control the characteristics and prices of vehicles in each market that they
operate. I do not impose this assumption in my model, and instead model the
trucking production sector with perfect competition. Modeling the oligopolistic
market structure with several competitors would not bring very different results
in terms of pricing and costs compared to a perfect competition setting (Simon,
1984). Therefore, I choose to drop the imperfect competition complication in
this chapter. Further, they include the scrap and used vehicle markets in their
analysis of passenger transport. As these markets are considerably smaller in
heavy freight and supplies are known to ebb and flow year on year, I do not
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account for carbon leakage through the second-hand heavy truck market (IEA,
2017a).
There are two economic agents in the model: new truck producers and trucking
companies. Trucks are distinguished only by fuel efficiency. For simplicity there
are two types of trucks: high fuel efficiency and low fuel efficiency. The truck
producer operates in both regions such that the price and fuel efficiency of each
truck model sold are identical in both markets. However, the price, fuel efficiency,
and R&D investment are determined by the fuel economy standards with which
the new fleet must comply. The trucking companies purchase a suite of trucks
to meet their annual driving needs at the lowest cost.
The model solves for supply and demand equilibrium prices and quantities in the
new truck market in both regions in both periods.
2.3.2 Demand
There are two representative trucking companies, one for each region. The com-
pany’s demand for trucks is a function of the purchase price and expected oper-
ating cost, both of which depend on fuel economy. There are two periods t = 1, 2
and two regions r = 1, 2 where r = 1 represents the region with stricter policy.
Further, there are two truck types f = 1, 2 that represent the low and high fuel
efficiency trucks. Trucks that are mainly used for short, national trips will have
a lower annual mileage. Conversely, trucks that are used for international trips
will have a higher annual mileage. Operating costs increase as annual mileage
increases, though the rate of this cost increase depends on the fuel efficiency of
the truck. While low fuel efficiency trucks have low purchase costs, the oper-
ating costs increase steeply and therefore, they are preferred for national trips.
High fuel efficiency trucks have higher purchase costs, but the operating costs are
gradually increasing with annual mileage. Therefore, high fuel efficiency trucks
are preferred for international trips.
As shown in Figure 2.1, high fuel efficiency trucks become optimal as the an-
nual mileage increases, while low fuel efficiency trucks are optimal for low annual
mileage requirements. However, as fuel efficiency improves (and operating cost
decreases) as a result of R&D investment, high fuel efficiency trucks become op-
timal also for lower annual mileage (national and international trips). I assume
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Figure 2.1: Annual cost of low and high fuel efficiency trucks
that each truck operates 300 days of the year and on each day makes either a
national or international trip. The lengths for a national trip ln and an interna-
tional trip li are fixed. The annual number of national and international trips
for an individual trucking company j are fixed and the annual total of freight
for each region is fixed. In this way, the trucking companies are differentiated by
the number of national and international trips they make annually.
Let qt,r,f be the number of trucks with fuel efficiency f in region r in period
t. The total annual cost for a truck in period t is the annuity of the purchase
price pt,f plus the operating costs. Purchase price pt,f and the purchase tax τt,r,f
depend on the fuel efficiency et,f of the truck. Operating cost is a function of
the variable fuel cost vt,r and the distance tax φt,r. The distance tax corrects for
the operating externalities such as noise, non-carbon emissions, accidents, and
congestion, which are, for simplicity, assumed to be identical for low and high
fuel efficiency trucks. Variable fuel cost vt,r is the sum of the fuel tax ωt,r and
the fuel resource cost rt,r in units e/L. The representative trucking company j
in region r chooses the quantities of low fuel efficiency and high fuel efficiency




qt,r,f (j) [pt,f + τt,r,f + (xn · ln + (300− xn)li) (et,fvt,f + φt,f )] (2.1)
where xn and (300−xn) are the total number of national and international trips
driven by a given truck annually.
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Each trucking company will allocate their fixed number of annual national and
international trips among their truck fleet by minimizing the sum of fixed costs
and operating costs for a given annual mileage m = (xn · ln + (300− xn)li).
∂C(j)
∂qt,r,f
= pt,f + τt,r,f +m(et,fvt,f + φt,f ) = 0 (2.2)
For the annual mileage m∗, the sum of fixed and operating costs is the same for
a low and high fuel efficiency truck. For annual mileages m ≥ m∗ the trucking
company will purchase a high fuel efficiency truck and for m < m∗ a low fuel
efficiency truck.
2.3.3 Supply
Truck producers maximize profits under perfect competition subject to the EU
fuel economy standards and strict national policy in region 1. The demand for
heavy freight trucks is highly fragmented. Producers sell both types of trucks in
both regions. They determine the level of fuel economy by taking into account
the cost of fuel economy improvements and the effect of improved fuel economy
on demand. The marginal cost of fuel economy improvements for the high fuel
efficiency truck can decrease as a result of technological change through R&D
investment. A key assumption for the choice of R&D investment is that producers
have perfect foresight and take the prices in period 1 and 2 as given.
The knowledge stock from R&D Zt is built up with annual investments zt−1 in
R&D, such that the knowledge stock Z2 is built up with annual R&D investments
z1. I normalize the first period stock of R&D knowledge, such that Z1 = 1. Fuel
efficiency can improve with or without R&D investment. In the first period, there
is fuel efficiency improvement for high fuel efficiency trucks as the producer is
bound to the fleet-wide standard that cannot be met unless they sell trucks with
higher fuel efficiency. The investment in R&D occurs in period 1 and reduces the
fuel efficiency related costs in period 2, such that the stock of R&D knowledge
in period 2 is given by
Z2 = (n1z1)
k (2.3)
where k is the elasticity of fuel efficiency related costs with respect to R&D
investment. The R&D investment function is h(z1) = γ0z
γ1
1 and therefore has
constant elasticity, where γ0 is an estimate of baseline R&D spending and γ1
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represents the elasticity of knowledge generation and R&D investment.
A representative truck producer maximizes the sum of profits in the first period
and the discounted sum of profits in the second period generated in both regions
subject to the EU truck fuel economy standards and the stricter standard in
the adopting region. As I assume perfect competition, each producer takes the
prices of trucks as given. The minimum fleet-wide fuel efficiency on new trucks
for truck producers is constrained by government policy. The truck producers
meet these standards by making the high fuel efficiency truck more fuel efficient.
I assume that there is reliable monitoring of the realized fuel efficiencies for new
trucks sold and that governments levy a fine high enough to ensure that truck





 n1(p1,fq1,r,f − C(Zt, e1,f ))
+ δn2(p2,fq2,r,f − C(Zt, e2,f ))− (1− σ)h(z1)
 (2.4)
where n1 is the number of years in period 1, n2 is the number of years in period
2, δ is the discount factor, and σ is the fraction of R&D investment h(z1) that is
paid by the government(s).
The production cost C(Zt, et,f ) has constant returns to scale and consists of a
fixed cost A and a variable cost that is a function of fuel efficiency. The cost of
the fuel efficiency improvement is quadratic in et,f and decreasing in knowledge
stock Zt from R&D investment. Cost savings from knowledge generation are not
region-specific.
















where bt,f and gt,f are calibration parameters.
∂Π
∂qt,r,f
= pt,f − Cq(Zt, et,f ) = 0 (2.6)
In maximizing profits, the purchase price of a truck is equal to the marginal
production cost. For period 1, simultaneously solving Equations 2.2 and 2.6
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as a system of linear equations subject to the production constraint on average
emissions of the fleet of new trucks sold returns the equilibrium price p1,f for
high fuel efficiency trucks and the equilibrium fuel efficiency e1,f . For period 2,
simultaneously solving Equations 2.2, 2.6, and 2.7 as a system of linear equations
returns the equilibrium price p2,f for high fuel efficiency trucks, the equilibrium
fuel efficiency e2,f , and the annual investment z1 in R&D.
∂Π
∂z1
= −(1− σ)h(z1)− δρn2CZ2(Z2, e2,f )kz
(k−1)








I assume that a given producer does not retain all of the knowledge generated
from their R&D investment. The return on a representative producer’s R&D
investment is based on the benefit from their own stock of R&D knowledge
as well as benefits spilt over from other firms’ stocks of knowledge. Thus, ρ
represents the fraction of knowledge that is retained by a representative producer
and appropriated from other producers. This spillover factor is only in the first-
order condition as it affects the share of future profits that the inventor retains
(Fischer and Newell, 2007). Truck producers invest the amount h(z1) in R&D
until the discounted returns from R&D investment are equal to the investment
cost of fuel efficiency improvement. The stricter the fuel efficiency standard,
the higher the marginal investment cost of fuel efficiency improvement and the
higher investment in R&D.
A representative truck producer faces the following overall fleet fuel efficiency
constraint for trucks sold in region 1:
et,1 · qt,1,1 + et,2 · qt,1,2
qt,1,1 + qt,1,2
≤ ēs (2.9)
And the same representative truck producer faces the overall fleet fuel efficiency
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constraint for trucks sold in the rest of the EU (region 2):
et,2 · qt,1,2 + et,2 · qt,2,2
qt,2,1 + qt,2,2
≤ ēEU (2.10)
where ēs refers to the stricter fuel economy standard in region 1 and ēEU refers
to the EU fuel economy standard.
2.3.4 Carbon emissions
Total annual carbon emissions intensity D in tonnes CO2 per 1000 tkm of the





where Xd is the carbon intensity of diesel in tonnes CO2 per liter consumed.
By nature of the stricter fuel economy standard, a less carbon intensive fleet will
operate in region 1. Therefore, the fleet in the rest of the EU can be more carbon
intensive, as the EU-wide fleet must comply with the EU-wide fuel economy
standard. Hence, the stricter the region 1 policy compared to the EU standard,
the higher will be the fleet emissions intensity in the rest of the EU. I refer to this
result as ‘carbon leakage’. The carbon leakage is determined by the difference
between the fleet emissions intensity where there is one EU standard, Dt,EU , and
the fleet emissions intensity in region 2 when there is a stricter emissions policy
adopted in region 1, Dt,2. The total annual carbon leakage in tonnes CO2 per
1000 tkm is given by
Dleakage = Dt,2 −Dt,EU(1− S1) (2.12)
where S1 is the fraction of total freight in the EU that takes place in region 1.
2.3.5 Policy cost and cost of saved CO2
To evaluate the different policy scenarios and simulations, I use the total policy
cost and cost of saved CO2 emissions.
In this chapter, I work with 3 main scenarios: I define a Business-as-Usual (BAU)
scenario where the total demand for EU road freight is met with trucks of uniform
constant fuel efficiency equivalent to the current average. In this scenario, there
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is no fuel efficiency standard policy. I define a baseline scenario where the EU
acts as a single region to meet the EU fuel economy standard. In the central
scenario, the EU is divided into two regions. Region 1 adopts a stricter fuel
economy standard and region 2 adheres only to the EU fuel economy standard.
Later, I conduct several different policy simulations of the central scenario, where
I vary the size of region 1 and the magnitude of the financial incentive for high
fuel efficiency trucks in region 1.
The total policy cost PC is the additional costs incurred by the trucking com-
panies, truck producers, and government compared to the costs that they would
have incurred in the Business-as-Usual scenario where there is no policy.
PC = n1(TC1,S − TC1,BAU) + δn2(TC2,S − TC1,BAU) (2.13)
The total cost TCS in each scenario is the sum of purchase and operating costs
for all trucks, the non-carbon external costs, and the government purchase sub-
sidies expenditure and investment in R&D minus the purchase tax revenue. I
specifically do not include the diesel tax revenue as it is effectively a carbon tax
and thereby a policy for emissions reductions. Therefore, it would muddle the
cost of the fuel efficiency policy.
To determine the average cost of saved CO2 emissions, for each policy scenario, I
compare the total cost TC minus the total carbon costs DC to that of the BAU
scenario. Then, divide this cost by the carbon savings D in the policy scenario
compared to the BAU scenario. n1[(TC1,S −DC1,S)− (TC1,BAU −DC1,BAU)]
+ δn2[(TC2,S −DC2,S)− (TC2,BAU −DC2,BAU)]

n1(D1,BAU −D1,S) + n2(D2,BAU −D2,S)
(2.14)
2.4 Solving the model
As producers sell the same two types of trucks to region 1 and region 2, produc-
ers will base their investment and manufacturing decisions on the stricter fuel
economy standard. Consequently, the fuel efficiencies of the high fuel efficiency
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trucks will be higher than in the case where they must only comply with an EU
fuel economy standard. To determine the effects of one region adopting a stricter
policy, there must be a baseline scenario. Therefore, the model first solves for the
market equilibrium when the EU truck fleet must comply with only the EU fuel
economy standard. This provides the baseline values for fuel efficiency, prices,
and quantities of new trucks sold. Additionally, with these values the research
expenditure and economic surplus are estimated.
In the next step, the model solves for market equilibrium when one region of
the EU adopts a stricter fuel economy standard. Now, producers optimize their
output for the stricter region. In this new market equilibrium, there are different
prices and fuel efficiencies to meet the stricter standard. The truck producers will
then optimize their fleet production based on these augmented fuel efficiencies
and prices. It is important to note that the truck producers will count the
additional emissions reduction taking place in region 1 toward the overall EU
fleet emission standard, allowing the producer to increase the fleet emissions
from trucks sold in region 2. Such that
et,1 · qt,2,1 + et,2 · qt,2,2
qt,1,1 + qt,1,2 + qt,2,1 + qt,2,2
≤ ēEU −
et,1 · qt,1,1 + et,2 · qt,1,2
qt,1,1 + qt,1,2 + qt,2,1 + qt,2,2
Meaning that the fleet fuel efficiency of trucks sold in region 2 will be lower than
the EU fuel efficiency standard.
With the market equilibria for regions 1 and 2, I can evaluate the effects of
incongruous national and international fuel economy standards on the rate of
high fuel efficiency truck adoption, the investment in high fuel efficiency truck
technology, and the change in regional carbon emissions reductions.
2.5 Data and numerical calibration
2.5.1 Cost parameters
To evaluate the international freight market, I calibrate the model using data
for the entire EU. In 2018, the total road freight within the 27 countries of the
EU amounted to 13.417 billion tonne-km (tkm) (Eurostat, 2020b). This includes
national trips within individual EU countries and international trips between
EU countries. I set the lengths for a national trip ln and an international trip
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li to 150 km and 500 km, respectively. This gives the total annual mileage for
a truck operating 300 days per year taking only national trips to be 45.000 km
and 150.000 km taking only international trips (based on IEA (2017a)). While
the baseline scenario keeps the EU intact, the central scenario divides the EU
into two regions. The region with the stricter fuel economy standard (region 1)
represents 5% of the total road freight in the central scenario. In Section 2.6, I
conduct policy simulations varying the size of region 1.
The annualized fixed cost A for freight trucks is based on a heavy-duty truck with
an annual mileage of 100.000 km and 20-tonne average payload. In all scenarios
and policy simulations, both the low and high fuel efficiency trucks have a fixed
cost of 55 e/1000 tkm (based on IEA (2017a), Delgado and Rodriguez (2018)).
The total cost of a high fuel efficiency truck will be higher as it also includes the
cost of fuel efficiency improvement. The fuel cost is set to 0,78 e/L and the fuel
tax is set to 0,5 e/L, both represent the EU average and are exogenous (EEA,
2019). The current average fuel efficiency for heavy duty trucks is 24L/1000 tkm
(IEA, 2017a). Low fuel efficiency trucks remain at this average value, while high
fuel efficiency trucks use it as a starting point to improve.









Low FE 55 0 55 1,28 24 30,7
High
FE
55 7,3 62,3 1,28 20,3 26,0
FE = fuel efficiency (L/1000 tkm)
Table 2.1 breaks down the components of the annual costs for low and high
fuel efficiency trucks, using the results from period 1 of the baseline scenario to
represent annual costs for a high fuel efficiency truck. The purchase price of the
low fuel efficiency truck includes only the fixed cost as there is no fuel efficiency
improvement. The purchase price of the high fuel efficiency truck is comprised
of the fixed cost and the cost of fuel efficiency improvement. The improved fuel
efficiency gives a lower operating cost for high fuel efficiency trucks. This annual
cost breakdown mirrors the graphical representation in Figure 2.1.
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As an additional incentive for high fuel efficiency trucks, region 1 adopts a Bonus-
Malus feebate system. In the central scenario, the feebate consists of a purchase
subsidy high fuel efficiency trucks that is equal to 5% of the purchase price of
a low fuel efficiency truck and a purchase tax on low fuel efficiency trucks that
is equal to 5% of the purchase price of a low fuel efficiency truck. In the policy
simulation, I will evaluate the impact of the Bonus-Malus feebate by varying the
amounts of the subsidies and taxes.
The external cost of trucks includes the cost of non-carbon emissions, noise,
congestion, accidents, and infrastructure wear and tear. All are identical for
both regions and the sum is set to 25 e/1000 tkm (van Essen et al., 2019). To
calculate the cost of damages from carbon emissions, I use the average EU ETS
value of 25 e/tonne CO2 (ICE, 2020).1
2.5.2 Fuel efficiency parameters
The model has two periods; the first period of 5 years represents target year 2025
and a second period of 5 years represents the target year 2030. I discount the
costs incurred in the second stage back to the present using a 10% private rate of
return, such that δ = 0, 38. The European Commission set the EU fuel economy
standard for 2025 to a 15% improvement in fleet fuel efficiency to 20,4 L/1000
tkm and for 2030 the standard is a 30% improvement in fleet fuel efficiency to
16,8 L/1000 tkm (EC, 2019c). The stricter region targets an additional 10% fleet
fuel efficiency improvement in both periods, meaning 25% for 2025 and 40% for
2030.
In a report prepared for the ICCT, Norris and Escher (2017) delineate the incre-
mental costs per liter diesel saved for a range of heavy freight truck fuel efficiency
technologies. For individual technologies the cost is as low as 0,005 e per liter
diesel saved, while for multi-technology packages the cost is 2,30 e per liter diesel
saved. In my analysis, I use a conservative estimate for the incremental cost of
fuel efficiency technologies of 2 e per liter diesel saved. With this value, I calcu-
late the cost of fuel efficiency improvement required to reach the 2025 and 2030
EU fuel economy targets, which amounts to 7,2 e/1000 tkm and 14,4 e/1000
tkm, respectively. I calibrate the parameters bt,f and gt,f in the production cost
1While different countries have different perceptions of the true value of carbon damages, I
take the value that is used in the EU market as a common estimate.
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equation with these cost estimates to -832 and 39.951.
2.5.3 R&D parameters
In the model, the relationship between knowledge generated through R&D zt,f
and stock of R&D Zt has constant elasticity. I set this elasticity kf = 0, 3 based
on several empirical studies that evaluate the elasticity of product costs with
respect to cumulative production (see Argote and Epple (1990), Nadiri (1993)).
In the R&D investment function, I set the elasticity of the relationship between
R&D investment and knowledge generation γ1 = 1, 2 based on Bottazzi and Peri
(2003), an empirical study regarding R&D spending and innovation measured by
patents. Calibrating the model with all other parameter assumptions, baseline
R&D spending for fuel efficiency improvement is γ0 = 545 million e or 0,05
e/1000 tkm. Given that the automobile manufacturing industry as a whole
reports spending 57,4 billion e annually on R&D, less than 1% being allocated
toward fuel efficiency improvement for freight trucks is a conservative estimate
(EAMA, 2019).
As I am calibrating the model for 27 EU countries with identical truck manu-
facturers, I use a knowledge appropriation factor ρ = 0, 5. Meaning that 50%
of the knowledge generated from R&D investment is retained by joint ventures
among EU producers for R&D, although the producers remain competitors on
the market. While each country is responsible for achieving the EU fleet fuel
economy standard using any mechanism they deem appropriate, I assume that
on average each country’s government will support the policy by contributing
10% of the R&D expenditure required, so σ = 0, 1. A summary of parameter
values is given in Appendix B.1.
2.6 Policy impacts
In the baseline, central, and policy simulation scenarios, I hold the total emissions
constant as in each scenario the EU policy for fleet fuel efficiency in 2025 and
2030 is met and the annual heavy truck road freight demand met by the fleet of
new trucks is the same. In this way, I only consider the differences in producer,
consumer, and government cost of achieving the same emissions reduction. I use
policy cost and cost of CO2 savings for the entire EU to meet the EU fuel economy
standard to compare the different scenarios and simulations. The Business-as-
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Usual scenario represents the case with no policy and therefore does not have
the same emissions reductions as all other scenarios (see Section 2.6.1).
To discern the insights of my results, I omit distance taxes for the various trucks
operating nationally and internationally within the 27 countries of the EU. This
removes any distance tax competition which distorts the incentives for high fuel
efficiency trucks. In this way, there are two key variables that drive the results:
the size of the region with stricter fuel efficiency standards and the magnitude
of the Bonus-Malus feebate in the region with stricter fuel efficiency standards.
The results reported in Table 2.2 represent the baseline scenario where all coun-
tries meet the EU policy of fleet fuel efficiency standards in 2025 and 2030. Table
2.3 represents the results of the central scenario where the EU is split into two
regions. Region 1 represents 5% of the EU and meets a fuel efficiency standard
stricter than the EU policy, while region 2 represents 95% of the EU and meets
the EU policy. Table 2.4 represents results of the policy simulations varying
the size of the region with the stricter fuel efficiency standard and the value of
the Bonus-Malus feebate incentivizing high fuel efficiency trucks in the stricter
region.
2.6.1 No policy: Business-as-Usual Scenario
Producers sell trucks at the lowest marginal cost. Fuel efficiency improvement
increases the purchase price, so without a binding constraint on the fuel efficiency
of the fleet of trucks sold, the purchase price is equal to the fixed cost. Given that
heavy duty truck production is a well-established and mature market, it is not
likely that there are significant learning by doing effects that will improve fuel
efficiency (IEA, 2017a). Therefore in the absence of a fuel efficiency standard,
low fuel efficiency trucks remain the only option for trucking companies and there
are no high fuel efficiency trucks developed, produced, or sold. Consequently, the
average fleet fuel efficiency remains 24 L/1000 tkm.
2.6.2 Baseline scenario
The introduction of a fuel efficiency standard causes producers to invest in R&D
to the extent that the discounted returns from selling high fuel efficiency trucks is
equal to the marginal investment cost. As a result, producers invest 1.463 million
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e in R&D which decreases the marginal cost of fuel efficiency improvement
by 28,6% in period 2 compared to the marginal cost in period 1. Lower fuel
requirements means lower operating costs, so trucking companies deploy high fuel
efficiency trucks for all international trips. Further, high fuel efficiency trucks
become cost-competitive for national trips, such that they are used for both
national and international trips. Consequently, 98% of new heavy trucks have
high fuel efficiency. However, the cost of the fuel efficiency improvement gives a
13% higher purchase cost than that of low fuel efficiency trucks (see Table 2.1),
leading trucking companies to continue to purchase a small number of low fuel
efficiency trucks deployed solely for national trips.
Table 2.2: Baseline scenario results
Period 1 Period 2
Share high FE trucks 98% 99%
Price of high FE truck (e/1000 tkm) 62,3 65,5
High FE (L/1000 tkm) 20,3 16,7
Average fleet FE (L/1000 tkm) 20,4 16,8
R&D expenditure (million e 1.463
Cost of policy (billion e) 418
Cost of CO2 saved (e/tonne CO2) 36
FE = fuel efficiency
The cost per tonne of CO2 saved is 36 e/tonne CO2. This is the lowest value of
all the scenarios and simulations run as this is the only case with a single policy
to which each EU country adheres. Following the significant literature on the
importance of international policy coordination (see Buiter and Marston (1986),
Canzoneri, Cumby, and Diba (2005)), the desired emissions reduction is achieved
at the lowest cost in the baseline scenario. The main reason being when one
country adopts a stricter standard, all producers must invest in R&D such that
the returns are equal to the marginal cost of fuel efficiency improvement. While
this stricter standard prompts producers to develop an even more fuel efficient
truck, it also leads to a higher price for high fuel efficiency trucks. A producer
charges the same price in all regions in which she operates, so the total cost of
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meeting the same standard significantly increases. Conversely, when there is a
single (less strict) standard, producers develop a truck to meet the fuel efficiency
requirements which hold in all regions where they operate. While this may lead
to a less fuel efficient truck compared to the aforementioned scenario, the price
will be lower and the standard will still be met though, now, it is at the optimal
(and significantly lower) cost.
In this scenario, the total policy cost of achieving the fuel efficiency standards is
418 billion e. If the EU were split into regions 1 and 2 according to the central
scenario, assuming the costs are uniformly distributed, the cost is 21 billion e
(5%) in region 1 and 397 billion e (95%) in region 2.
2.6.3 Central scenario
The central scenario divides the EU into two regions: region 1 represents 5% of
the total road freight in the EU and adopts a fleet fuel economy standard that is
stricter than the EU standard and region 2 represents the rest of the EU. Region
1 requires 10% more fuel economy improvement compared to the EU standard in
both periods and employs a purchase subsidy for high fuel efficiency trucks and
a purchase tax for low fuel efficiency trucks, the value of the respective subsidy
and tax are equal to 5% of the purchase price of the low fuel efficiency truck.
Because region 1 adopts stricter fuel economy standards, truck producers invest
more in R&D to produce trucks that are even more fuel efficient compared to
the baseline scenario in period 2 (see Equation 2.8). Producers increase R&D
spending by 31%, which enables a 29,5% decrease in the marginal cost of fuel
efficiency improvement in period 2 compared to the marginal cost in period 1. Of
course, this improvement comes at the cost of 7% and 5% increase in the purchase
price of high fuel efficiency trucks in periods 1 and 2. However, the Bonus-Malus
feebate in region 1 reduces the purchase price for trucking companies and allows
high fuel efficiency trucks to be cost-competitive for national and international
trips. Consequently, high fuel efficiency trucks comprise 99% of the trucking
fleet.
Given that region 1 overshoots the EU standard, truck producers sell a fleet of
trucks to region 2 that does not achieve the target EU average fleet fuel economy.
Therefore, the effective fuel economy standard for region 2 is 20,5 L/1000 tkm in
period 1 and 16,9 L/1000 tkm in period 2. This relaxed average fleet fuel economy
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Share high FE trucks in region 1 99% 99%
Share high FE trucks in region 2 57% 73%
Price of high FE truck (e/1000 tkm) 67,2 68,7
High FE (L/1000 tkm) 17,9 14,3
∆ Carbon emissions region 1 compared to baseline - 12% - 14%




R&D expenditure (million e) 1.928
Cost of policy (billion e) 669
Cost of CO2 saved (e/tonne CO2) 49,3
requirement coupled with higher fuel efficiencies, enables truck producers to sell
fewer high fuel efficiency trucks in region 2. All of the additional emissions
reductions occurring in region 1 are leaked to region 2. Consequently, carbon
emissions in region 2 increase by 0,6% and by 0,08%, while carbon emissions
decrease by 12% and 14% in periods 1 and 2 relative to the baseline scenario.
Together, the introduction of the Bonus-Malus feebate and higher prices for high
fuel efficiency trucks drive the policy cost up to 287 billion e in region 1 (see
Table 2.5). Although the purchase price of high fuel efficiency trucks is higher,
trucking companies in region 2 purchase far fewer. Therefore, compared to the
baseline scenario, the total policy cost is lower in region 2 at 382 billion e. The
high policy cost induces a high cost of carbon saved of 49 e/tonne CO2.
It is important to note how the distribution of costs changes significantly in this
scenario. As one country institutes a stricter national policy, it also ends up pay-
ing the brunt of the costs of meeting the international policy. The nonconforming
country does itself no favors by enacting a stricter standard that effectively drives
up the price for high fuel efficiency trucks.
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2.6.4 Policy variations
In the policy simulations, I vary the relative size of region 1 and the amount of
the Bonus-Malus feebate in region 1. The total costs of achieving the policy range
in magnitude and regional distribution for each simulation. Table 2.4 displays
the policy simulation results relative to the baseline scenario. Table 2.5 indicates
the total cost of achieving the EU fuel economy standard policy and the effective
average fleet fuel efficiency in each region, as well as the cost per tonne of carbon
saved.














Baseline 20,3 | 16,7 62,3 | 65,5 98% | 99% – | – 1.463
Central -11,8%| -14,3% +7,7%|+5,0% -41,7%| -26,0% +0,6%|+0,8% +31,8%
No B-M R1 -12,0%| -14,5% +8,0%|+5,2% -42,1%| -26,3% +0,6%|+0,8% +32,4%
High B-M R1 -11,6%| -14,0% +7,5%|+4,8% -41,3%| -25,6% +0,6%|+0,8% +31,1%
R1 1% -11,8%| -14,3% +7,7%|+5,0% -40,0%| -24,9% +0,12%|+0,14% +31,8%
R1 10% -11,8%| -14,3% +7,7%|+5,0% -44,0%| -27,4% +1,3%|+1,6% +31,8%
2.6.4.1 No Bonus-Malus region 1
I start by removing the Bonus-Malus feebate in region 1. As I assume perfect
competition in truck production, prices are determined by demand. Trucking
companies make purchase decisions based on the annual costs which includes
the purchase tax or subsidy (see Equation 2.2). While removing only the sub-
sidy would decrease the equilibrium price for high fuel efficiency trucks, removing
only the tax would increase the equilibrium purchase price for high fuel efficiency
trucks. In the central scenario, the subsidy represents 4% of the high fuel effi-
ciency truck purchase price and the tax represents 5% of the low fuel efficiency
truck purchase price, therefore tax effect dominates and the equilibrium purchase
price of the high fuel efficiency truck increases.
The marginal production cost (and therefore the purchase price) for high fuel
efficiency trucks consists of the fixed cost A and the variable cost for fuel efficiency
improvement (see Equation 2.5). A higher purchase price allows producers to
spend more on the fuel efficiency improvement. In period 1, marginal cost of
fuel efficiency is the same as the central scenario, so with the higher purchase
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price, fuel efficiency improves more. As producers have perfect foresight, they
invest in R&D in period 1 until the returns from R&D equal the marginal cost
of investment in fuel efficiency improvement in period 2. Without the Bonus-
Malus feebate, the optimal R&D investment in period 1 is higher, reflecting
the higher return from R&D generated from the higher purchase price. This
increase in R&D investment enables the truck producers to achieve even better
fuel efficiencies at a lower marginal cost in period 2.
As the new trucks are more fuel efficient than in the central scenario, truck
producers sell fewer high fuel efficiency trucks in region 2 compared to the central
scenario. However, the higher purchase price for high fuel efficiency trucks leads
the policy cost in region 2 to be higher compared to the central scenario. The
total policy cost is lower for region 1, as the higher purchase price is outweighed
by the cost savings from removing the feebate system. It follows that the cost
of carbon saved is also lower at 36,3 e/tonne CO2. As regions 1 and 2 are the
same relative size as in the central scenario, the amount of carbon leakage is the
same.
2.6.4.2 Increased Bonus-Malus region 1
Now, I increase the Bonus-Malus feebate by 100%. Increasing the feebate system
decreases the equilibrium purchase price for high fuel efficiency trucks. As the
fixed cost remains 55 e/1000 tkm, the variable cost of fuel efficiency is now lower
than the central scenario. In period 1, marginal cost of fuel efficiency is the same
as the central scenario, and as a result of the lower purchase price, fuel efficiency
does not improve as much. Producers invest less in R&D compared to the central
scenario as the purchase price in period 2 is lower than in the central scenario,
and thus the return on R&D investment is lower. With less R&D, the marginal
cost of fuel efficiency does not decrease as much as in the central scenario. The
lower purchase price for high fuel efficiency trucks combined with the smaller
investment in R&D result in less fuel efficiency improvement in period 2. This
requires truck producers to sell more high fuel efficiency trucks in region 2 to
reach the effective average fleet fuel efficiency.
With lower purchase prices, the total cost of achieving the policy is lower in
region 2 than in the central scenario. However, the increased feebate system
drives up the cost of the policy in region 1 to 541 billion e. This gives a higher
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cost of carbon saved at 62 e/tonne CO2. Again, as regions 1 and 2 are the same
relative size as in the central scenario, the carbon leakage is unchanged.
2.6.4.3 Region 1 1% of total EU
Returning the Bonus-Malus feebate implemented in the central scenario, I re-
duce the size of region 1 to just 1% of the total EU road freight demand. Given
the same feebate system as the central scenario, producers will invest the same
amount in R&D, which yields the same purchase prices, fuel efficiencies, and
operating costs. Therefore, truck producers sell the same shares of high fuel effi-
ciency trucks and low fuel efficiency trucks in region 1, but the absolute number
of trucks purchased is 80% lower. Fewer trucks also means fewer purchase taxes
and subsidies. Taken together, the total cost of meeting the policy decreases in
region 1 to 261,1 billion e.
Since region 1 is smaller, the average fleet fuel economy required for region 2 to
meet the EU standard is more stringent than the central scenario. Consequently,
truck producers must sell more high fuel efficiency trucks in region 2. Therefore,
the total cost of meeting the EU fuel economy standard policy increases in region
2 to 408 billion e. The total cost of meeting the policy is 669,2 billion e, which
is approximately equal to the central scenario policy cost of 669,0 billion e. The
key difference is the distribution of the costs between regions 1 and 2. The added
costs of more high fuel efficiency trucks in region 2 outweighs the cost savings of
fewer trucks in region 1, leading to a slightly higher policy cost. Nearly identical
policy costs yields nearly identical costs of saved carbon of 49,3 e/tonne CO2.
With region 1 80% smaller than in the central scenario, the carbon emissions
leakage from region 1 to region 2 is 80% lower at 0,12% in period 1 and 0,14%
in period 2.
2.6.4.4 Region 1 10% of total EU
Now, I increase the size of region 1 to 10% of the total EU road freight demand.
Again, the fuel efficiency improvements, R&D investment, and purchase prices
are identical to the central scenario because the Bonus-Malus feebate system is
the same magnitude. Again, the total policy cost 668,8 billion e is approximately
the same as the central scenario and the distribution of costs between regions is
different. Truck producers make the same production decisions as in the central
scenario, though there are 100% more trucks sold and 100% more taxes and
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subsidies levied. As a result, the policy cost in region 1 is higher at 319 billion
e.
In this case, the average fleet fuel economy in region 1 accounts for twice as much
of the total EU fleet fuel economy, such that the average fleet fuel economy in
region 2 is more lax than the EU fuel economy standard at 20,7 L/1000 tkm
in period 1 and 17,1 L/1000 tkm in period 2. This enables truck producers
to sell fewer high fuel efficiency trucks in region 2 than in the central scenario
which decreases the policy cost to 349 billion e in this region. In this case, the
lower costs from fewer high fuel efficiency trucks in region 2 outweighs the cost
increase of more trucks in region 1, leading to a slightly lower total policy cost.
However, the total policy cost is close enough to the central scenario that the
cost of carbon saved is approximately the same at 49,3 e/tonne CO2. Lastly,
the carbon emissions leakage from region 1 to region 2 increases in proportion
to the size of region 1. Meaning that the more countries that adopt road freight
economy standards that are stricter than the EU standard, the more carbon
leakage there will be to the rest of the EU.
Table 2.5: Cost of policy relating to cost of saved CO2
Cost of Policy (bill e) e/tonne CO2
saved
Region 1 Region 2 Total
Baseline scenario values 20,9 396,8 417,7 36,2
Central scenario 287,0 382,1 669,0 49,3
No Bonus-Malus region 1 32,9 385,4 36,3
Increased Bonus-Malus region 1 541,4 378,7 920,1 62,3
Region 1 1% of total EU 261,1 408,1 669,2 49,3
Region 1 10% of total EU 319,4 349,5 668,8 49,3
It is clear from Table 2.5 that removing the Bonus-Malus feebate system produces
a lower cost of meeting the policy and thus a lower cost of carbon savings. Varying
the size of region 1 affects the magnitude of inadvertent carbon leakage in the
rest of the EU and the distribution of costs between the regions.
It is clear that the magnitude of the Bonus-Malus policy has a significant impact
on the fuel efficiency improvement and producer investment in R&D, while there
is no effect on carbon leakage. The larger the feebate policy for consumers, the
lower the equilibrium price of high fuel efficiency trucks. So, producers have less
capital to invest in R&D and fuel efficiencies do not improve as much as in the
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Table 2.6: Change in fleet fuel efficiency (period 1 | period 2)
Average Fleet FE (L/1000 tkm)
Region 1 Region 2 Total
Baseline scenario values 20,4|16,4 20,4|16,4 20,4|16,4
Central scenario 18,0|14,4 20,5|16,9 20,4|16,4
No Bonus-Malus region 1 18,0|14,4 20,5|16,9 20,4|16,4
Increased Bonus-Malus region 1 18,0|14,4 20,5|16,9 20,4|16,4
Region 1 1% of total EU 18,0|14,4 20,4|16,8 20,4|16,4
Region 1 10% of total EU 18,0|14,4 20,7|17,1 20,4|16,4
central scenario. Because producers can charge a higher purchase price when the
feebate system is removed, there is more capital for fuel efficiency improvement







































Figure 2.2: Distribution of policy costs vs. cost of carbon saved
Figure 2.2 illustrates the relationship between the cost of carbon saved and the
share of the total policy cost in region 2. In the baseline scenario, the policy costs
are distributed proportional to size, such that 95% of the costs occur in region 2.
When region 1 adopts a stricter policy and introduces a feebate system, it takes
on a larger share of the costs. Therefore, in the central scenario, the share of
policy cost in region 2 shrinks to 57%. Not only does varying the magnitude of
the Bonus-Malus feebate system affect the cost of carbon savings, it significantly
changes the distribution of costs between regions 1 and 2. Removing the feebate
system reduces the costs in region 1 significantly, such that the total policy costs
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are distributed similar to the baseline scenario with 92% occurring in region 2.
Increasing the feebate system increases the policy cost in region 1, such that the
total cost of the policy is high and the share in region 2 is lower at 41%. While
changing the size of region 1 affects the distribution of costs between regions,
the total policy cost, and thereby the cost of CO2 saved, remains approximately
the same. Reducing the size of region 1 shifts the policy cost burden to region 2,
while increasing the size of region 1 shifts the policy costs away from region 2.
2.7 Conclusions
I evaluate the impact of an EU member country enacting a stricter fuel economy
standard on the total cost of meeting the EU policy for the rest of the EU. In my
analysis, I find that any EU member country, regardless of its size, introducing
a stricter standard will increase the average cost of carbon savings for all EU
members. The stricter standard increases the marginal cost of fuel efficiency and
increases the investment in R&D to lower this marginal cost. This translates
to a higher policy cost of achieving the same total emissions reductions. With
increased fuel efficiency improvement, truck producers sell fewer high fuel effi-
ciency trucks in region 2 to meet the EU standard, such that the policy cost in
region 2 is lower. The stricter standard in region 1 requires truck producers to
sell more high cost, high fuel efficiency trucks. This production behavior coupled
with the introduction of a feebate system gives a significantly higher policy cost
in region 1, which gives a higher total cost of reaching the policy and cost of
carbon saved. When all countries across the EU adhere to the same standard,
the policy is met at the lowest cost.
In my analysis, I find that the magnitude of the Bonus-Malus feebate has a
significant impact on the distribution of costs between regions 1 and 2. Without
purchase taxes and subsidies, the policy cost in region 1 is higher solely as a result
of the stricter policy increasing the marginal cost of fuel efficiency. Removing the
feebate system lowers the cost of carbon saved and achieves the policy cost closest
to the optimal scenario where all EU countries adhere to the same standard.
Hence, this chapter reveals an inadvertent trade-off between a feebate system
and the producer investment in R&D.
Finally, I find that the size of the country (or countries) adopting a stricter fuel
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economy policy minimally affects the total cost of achieving the EU standard.
These countries will take on a larger share of the policy costs compared to the
baseline central scenario. At the end of the day, the EU fleet is what is measured,
so taking on additional emissions reductions only enables other countries to relax
their efforts.
Chapter 3
How to be a Good Forerunner in
Carbon Neutral Trucking
3.1 Introduction
The main purpose of this chapter is to provide a deeper understanding of how
international competition affects investment in new infrastructure for long-haul
electric trucks. Sweden or California are more ambitious to reduce carbon emis-
sions from trucking than their neighbors. Imagine a forerunner country or state
starts building electric highways that allow electric trucks (ET) to be recharged
continuously via catenary lines. Electric highways (EH) combined with battery
capacity for the smaller trips connected to the highway allow the forerunner to
electrify truck transportation and significantly reduce its carbon emissions.
Börjesson, Johansson, and Kageson (2020) made a cost-benefit analysis for the in-
troduction of ET. They found electric trucks using electric highways a worthwhile
public investment proposal in Sweden for carbon shadow values of 136 e/tonne
of CO2. This would reduce carbon emissions by one third for heavy trucks in
Sweden. But truck transportation within a federation (EU, US) is increasingly
long distance rather than local, so the ultimate costs and emission reduction
success will depend on whether the neighbors follow the forerunner and how the
forerunner state or country deals with international trucking. What neighbor-
ing countries will do in response depends on strategic considerations as there
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will only be coordination when it brings significant benefits. This is the main
research question of this chapter: will neighbors with different climate policies
follow the ambitious forerunner?
Options to reduce carbon emissions from heavy trucks
There are four options to reduce dependence on oil and decarbonize heavy trucks:
improve fuel efficiency per ton kilometer, improve the load factor of trucks, switch
to alternative fuels and powertrains, or switch transport modes and use rail and
waterways.
At present, the main EU initiative is the regulation that forces all new heavy
trucks to reduce their carbon emissions by 15% in 2025 and by 30% in 2030 (EC,
2019c). Improving fuel efficiency can be achieved by using existing technologies
such as aerodynamic truck fittings, low rolling resistance tires, and automated
transmission systems. There may be further advances in fuel efficiency (IEA,
2017a), however, at some point the marginal cost of these efficiency measures
will become very high and one will need to switch to carbon-neutral fuels.
The average load factor is in the range of 70% for larger trucks (Schroten et al.,
2019). It is advocated that a much higher load factor is possible with better
coordination. This may be out of reach for several reasons. First, the incentives
to achieve a better load factor are already present: every empty truck kilometer
is costly in terms of capital and driver wages for the trucking company. Second,
trucks are often dedicated to carry one type of goods only: a milk truck is not
allowed to bring back a load of gasoline.
This leaves us with alternative fuels. As sustainable biofuels have only limited
potential, one is left with the choice between battery electric trucks and hydrogen
fuel. The latter option is, for the moment, losing the game for two reasons. First,
due to the progress in electric battery size and density. Second, because the
conversion of renewable energy into hydrogen has a very low overall efficiency
(35%) (Belmans and Vingerhoets, 2020).
Waterways and rail are only options for particular categories of (bulk or con-
tainer) goods, so we focus mainly on freight transport that is difficult to sub-
stitute and has to use trucks. According to Börjesson, Johansson, and Kageson
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(2020), who use a detailed freight model, the modal substitution between freight
modes when ET are progressively introduced is small: on the order of a few
percent in Sweden.
Infrastructure for electric heavy trucks
In this chapter, we will focus on battery electric trucks as the primary alterna-
tive to existing diesel trucks. We consider battery-electric and plug-in hybrid
trucks, both of which are in the early development stage with pilot projects in
Sweden, Germany, and California. Plug-in hybrid trucks are expected to have a
large battery together with a diesel engine. In this way, they are intended to be
a bridging technology from traditional diesel engines to battery-electric power-
trains. But we concentrate on the endpoint of the technology development: the
full electric truck.
As battery weight will probably remain an important limitation for electric
trucks, one needs either a very quick charge for the battery or a continuous
power supply for most of the journey. So, the battery-electric trucks face the ad-
ditional cost of electric motorway infrastructure. Technologically, there are two
ways to supply electricity in a continuous way to trucks: by induction and by
connecting to overhead lines via a catenary. The overhead line catenary system
promises to be the cheapest and this option is now considered for deployment
at the major motorways. On the motorways, the electric trucks would operate
using the overhead lines but on the other connecting roads, the trucks would
operate on their battery (see Figure 3.1)1.
Neighboring countries choosing different options
As technologies are in full development and countries want to move at different
speeds for decarbonizing their transport sector, coordination issues will appear.
The very ambitious countries may develop electric motorways and promote the
development of electric trucks, other countries may wait with the electric motor-
way. To analyze the problem, we need to take into account two more dimensions.
First, we need to distinguish domestic and international truck traffic. Second,
diesel fuel taxes are the ideal carbon tax but their potential is limited by tank
1Detailed information on the demonstration project can be found at Siemens AG / Siemens
Mobility GmbH (2017)
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Figure 3.1: Siemens eHighway catenary electric truck
tourism: it is very difficult for a country to raise diesel taxes because trucks can
fuel abroad. For this reason, the main instrument used by an individual member
country are distance taxes. They are not yet introduced by all European coun-
tries, but countries will almost be forced to install them because a country with
distance taxes always wins the fuel tax game (Mandell and Proost, 2016).
Consider now one forerunner country (Sweden) and one neighboring country
(Germany) and concentrate on the steady state where the whole truck fleet is
re-optimized. When the forerunner installs electric highways, it can differentiate
its distance charges for trucks to incentivize the use of electric trucks. This
can force the domestic trucks to switch to electricity, but for international truck
transport the problem is different. As long as the neighboring country does not
install electric motorways, there are two solutions. Either international trucks
will remain diesel trucks and they are used for the whole trip through both
countries, or they have to use a tractor-trailer combination where they switch
between diesel and electric tractor at the border. This second option is clearly
more extensive.
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Research questions
The research questions for this chapter now become clear. First, what would
be the outcome of the non-cooperative game between a forerunner country that
wants to install electric highways and a lagging neighbor that does not? Second,
how costly is the forerunner strategy for this country? Third, what are the
possible gains of cooperation when both countries install electric highways?
This chapter is organized as follows: Section 3.2 will outline the game tree and
define the analytical model. Section 3.3 deals with the model calibration, Section
3.4 discusses the numerical results, and Section 3.5 concludes.
3.2 Building the model
3.2.1 Game tree
To gain insight we use a formulation with only two countries where one country is
a forerunner in installing electric highways and the second country is the lagging
neighbor.
We have a game with three players: the forerunner country, the lagging neighbor
country, and the truck companies. Figure 3.2 presents the game tree for the
non-cooperation case: the forerunner can decide to install or not install electric
highways. When it installs electric highways, it has also to decide on the level of
its distance charges. In the EU, the distance charges cannot discriminate against
trucks from other countries, one can only discriminate in function of objective
criteria, such as the environmental performance or the axle weight. This means
that the forerunner will certainly set the distance charge (on diesel trucks) high
enough to force domestic trucks to become electric, otherwise their investment
would be pointless. The forerunner could even opt for a much higher distance
charge on diesel trucks so that international trucks coming from a lagging neigh-
bor country have to switch tractors at the border.
Once the forerunner has installed electric motorways and decided on its distance
charge, the neighbor has to decide whether it also invests in electric motorways
or not and what diesel and electric distance charge it should use.
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Figure 3.2: The game scenarios
Once the two countries have set their infrastructure and pricing policies, the
domestic and international trucking companies decide on the type of truck they
use. As, by assumption, the trucking companies face perfect competition, the
user cost of both types of trucks will determine the volumes of domestic and
international trucking and the type of truck that is used.
Each country has, in principle, many instruments to steer the type of truck and
the volume of truck use: diesel fuel tax, distance tax on diesel trucks, distance
tax on electric trucks as well as the price of electricity. These instruments largely
overlap each other. Therefore, we chose the distance tax on diesel trucks as the
principal policy instrument and keep the diesel fuel tax constant and identical
for the forerunner and the neighbor.
3.2.2 Assumptions and model set-up
We use a model set-up that is inspired by Mandell and Proost (2016). This was
a model to study international tax competition for fuel and distance taxes for
trucks. That model will be extended for environmental considerations and for
investment decisions.
We assume that the neighboring country (N) has size 2γ and the forerunner (F)
has size 2(1−γ), where γ ∈ [0.5, 1]. On average, domestic trips in the neighboring
country will cover a distance γ and in the forerunner country domestic trips will
cover a distance (1− γ). International trips will be of length 1 with a part γ in
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the neighboring country and a part (1 − γ) in the forerunner country. The trip
length is fixed, though the number of trips is variable.
We begin by assuming linear demand functions for domestic trips in the forerun-
ner country (dF ) and domestic trips in the neighboring country (dN) in function
of the user costs kF and kN for domestic trips.
dF = a− bkF
dN = a− bkN
(3.1)
The linear demand function for international trips (dint) is the same in both
countries and is a function of the user cost for international trips Kint.
dint = α− βKint (3.2)
We will denote the demand for truck trips in tonne-kilometers (tkm) travelled.
The demand for truck trips can be segregated into electric de and/or fossil fuel df
truck trips in tkm. We assume that domestic trucking and international trucks
have each a fixed annual mileage so that the average cost per mile is constant and
that we do not have to bother about the number of trucks. This assumption also
implies that trucking companies will either choose an electric truck or a diesel
truck for their domestic trips and select one type of truck for their international
trips.
Domestic trucks can only use the local road network and buy fuel locally. The
generalized cost of local transport by fossil fuel trucks is determined by the total
capital and fuel cost before taxes cf , the fuel tax tf , and the distance charge td.
The generalized cost of local transport by electric trucks is determined by the
total capital and electricity cost before taxes ce, the electric motorway network
connection tax te, and the distance charge td. We can differentiate the distance
charge for fossil fuel trucks tdFT and electric trucks t
d
ET as the different trucks have
different environmental externalities. The fuel, electricity, and distance charges
will differ between the two countries and will also depend on the relative size
and importance of international demand.
Therefore, the generalized cost of a single domestic trip (k) for the forerunner
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and the neighboring country will be a function of the relative distance:
























The trucking companies will choose the truck technology with the minimum cost.
The total cost of domestic trips equals the total distance travelled d times the
unit cost of a diesel or an electric truck:




























The generalized cost of international trips by diesel trucks equals the sum of
costs at home and abroad.
Kfint = c
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International fossil fuel freight trucks will minimize their diesel fuel costs by
refueling in the country with the lower diesel fuel tax that they drive through.
We use a reduced form formulation σJtfF , t
f
NK to capture this cost minimization
process where the market share σ ∈ [0, 1] in the international trucking fuel market
is a function of the two diesel tax rates. The parameter ρ is a measure of the
intensity of tax competition; a small ρ means that an increase in the fuel tax
difference between the forerunner and the neighboring country does not strongly
affect the market share σ in the international trucking fuel market.
As electric vehicles cannot fuel strategically, the generalized cost of international
trips for electric freight trucks will be equal to the non-fuel and non-tax related
cost per mile ce plus the variable cost of the part of the trip in the neighboring
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country plus the variable cost of the part in the forerunner country:
Keint = c
e + γ(tdET,N + t
e
N) + (1− γ)(tdET,F + teF ) (3.8)
And when the tractors need to be switched at the Swedish border, we have an
additional switching cost SC:
Kswitchint = γ(c
f + tdFT,N + t
f
N) + (1− γ)(c
e + tdET,F + t
e
F ) + SC (3.9)
We assume that domestic governments set taxes and decide to invest or not in
electric highways in function of the sum of consumer surplus of domestic trucking
(cs) plus half of the consumer surplus from international trucking (CS) plus the
total tax revenues minus the total external costs (ec) within the country and
minus the infrastructure costs of implementing electric highways (IT ). Because
both countries benefit from international trips through trade, we assume that
they share equally in the gains from the international transaction, so we count
only half of the consumer surplus from international trucking. The main external
cost we consider is climate damage. In this way, the more importance a country
places on climate goals – and the stricter its climate policy – the higher the
value of the external costs ec it considers. The external cost is expressed per
kilometer, considering a standardized long-haul truck that complies with the
emission standard.
In the baseline scenario, the forerunner and the neighboring countries only use
diesel trucks, there is no investment in electric highways, and the objective func-
tion of the neighboring country becomes:











The two first terms represent the effects on domestic trucking: the consumer
surplus of domestic trucking and the total tax revenue from trucking minus the
external cost. The third and fourth term represent the consumer surplus and the
tax revenue and environmental costs from international trucking. The last term
represents the fixed investment and maintenance costs of electric highways, the
variable costs of electric highways are included in the electricity costs of trucks.
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3.3 Solving the game
We will consider four scenarios: no electric highways in either country, electric
highways in both countries, and electric highways in the forerunner with and
without high distance charges. We solve for the non-cooperative outcome of
these four cases. To solve the game, we need to compare the pay-off functions of
the two countries for each of the two options with or without electric highways.
We take as the baseline scenario, the case where both the forerunner and the
neighbor do not invest in electric highways and both countries have fossil fuel
trucks operating domestically and internationally. Put another way, climate is
somewhat important but not sufficient to spur investment in electric motorways.
For each of the three possible scenarios, we need to determine the Nash equilib-
rium of the distance tax for fossil driven trucks and the distance tax for electric
trucks. The Nash equilibrium can result in electric highways in one country,
then the domestic road freight will be electric but the international road freight
in that country can only become electric in two cases. The first case is when
both countries have electric highways and the second case is when the country
with electric highways forces the trucks to change their tractor when they enter
the country. In the numerical solution, we also take into account that there is
learning by doing when more than one country adopts electric highways. This
will result in a lower investment cost for the lagging neighbor. As this is a fixed
cost, it will not affect the optimal tax setting expressions we use for the formal
solution of the game.
We can study the Nash equilibrium by deriving the first order conditions with
respect to the distance charges for fossil fuel (diesel) trucks tdFT and electric
trucks tdET and evaluating the resultant reaction equations. One could also add
fuel taxes as policy instruments, but they are to some extent substitutes for
distance taxes. In order to simplify the analysis, we keep the fuel taxes fixed.
We start with the baseline case.
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3.3.1 No electric highways









The distance charge on diesel trucks (LHS) will equal the external cost (second
term) corrected for the part that is already internalized by the fuel tax (third
term) plus half of the marginal distance tax revenue (first term). The revenue
motive only counts for half, because the neighboring country will incur half of
the efficiency losses in case the taxes are set too high.

























The optimal distance tax reaction function has again a revenue term that is
now mitigated by the domestic demand elasticity – the distance tax will now
also distort local transport decisions when it becomes too high. The optimal
distance tax internalizes the external environmental costs to the extent that it
is not internalized by the fuel tax.
We have a similar type of reaction function for the forerunner’s distance tax on
diesel trucks. The Nash equilibrium will contain higher distance taxes in the
forerunner country than in the neighboring country because the neighbor has
more to gain by higher taxes as the share of international traffic is relatively
more important.
3.3.2 Electric highways with high switching costs
In this case the distance taxes in the forerunner country will certainly favor the
use of electric trucks for domestic trucking, otherwise their investment in electric
highways would be pointless. But as long as the switching costs at the border
(changing tractors) are high, and as the forerunner bears half of the additional
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switching costs because the international transport surplus is shared between the
two countries, it will prefer that international trucks continue to use diesel trucks
and opt for a distance tax that is not too high.
As the forerunner wants its domestic trucks to be electric but keep the distance
tax for diesel trucks relatively low, it has to use a high diesel fuel tax. In this way
it can avoid the extra costs of changing tractors at the border. In this case, all
international diesel trucks will do all of their fueling in the neighboring country,
so σ = 1. The neighbor’s distance taxes for diesel trucks will still be used to
extract revenue from international trucking. In this case, the neighbor has the
same distance tax reaction function as before except that σ = 1.
In the forerunner country the distance tax on diesel trucks will take into account
that international trucks take diesel fuel in the neighboring country and that













The distance tax on electric trucks equals the external cost as electric trucks are
only used domestically.
3.3.3 Electric highways with low switching costs
When switching costs are relatively low, the forerunner may prefer an equilibrium
where all traffic within its borders is carried out by electric trucks. In this case,
we assume that international trucking will switch trucks at the border. In this
way, the neighbor’s trucks will operate only within its borders and vice versa.
The switching cost will increase the user cost of international trucking and the
loss of consumer surplus will be shared among the two countries.
To start the computation of the equilibrium reaction functions, we can assume
again that the fuel tax in the forerunner country is very high as it will not be
used by domestic nor by international trucks. The forerunner’s distance tax for
diesel trucks will also be very high as one wants to avoid all diesel trucks. The
distance tax for electric trucks can now be increased and will take away part of
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+ (ecelF − tdET,F − teF ) (3.14)
Of course, the reaction functions are implicit equations and the switching cost
will decrease the international trucking demand.
When it comes to the neighboring country, the switching costs decrease the
international road traffic, so it may lower the distance tax to lessen the blow of
the consumer surplus loss. The optimal distance tax has the same expression as
in the case with no electric trucks.
3.3.4 Electric highways in both countries
As opposed to diesel trucks, electric vehicles cannot fuel strategically. There will
be tax exporting in distance tax revenues with a distance tax on electric trucks
that is too high.
3.4 Numerical illustration
To explore the investment and distance tax competition dynamic between asym-
metric countries, we calibrate the model for Sweden as the forerunner and Ger-
many as the lagging neighbor.
In 2017, the total amount of goods transported by road in Germany and Swe-
den amounted to 313.000 million tonne-km (tkm) and 37.000 million tonne km,
respectively (Eurostat, 2017). International transport between the two coun-
tries amounted to 16.000 million tkm. For Germany, this represents 5% of total
freight demand, while in Sweden it is equal to almost 50% of all domestic truck
transport volume, which underscores the asymmetry of these countries. We will
later make sensitivity studies on the importance of the relative size of the two
countries. To do this, we keep the international transport flows constant and
redistribute the domestic transport flows over the two countries. In this way the
international truck transport flows vary in importance and this will turn out to
be important for the distance tax setting.
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We base our calculations on a heavy-duty truck with an annual mileage of 100.000
km and an average payload of 20 tonnes. In the base scenario, the fuel and
electricity taxes are exogenous (based on EEA (2019) and Eurostat (2019a)).
The average costs given in Table 3.1 of diesel truck transport is assumed to be
73 e/1000 tkm of which 25% stems from fuel cost (based on IEA (2017a)). We
take the average cost of battery-electric truck that has a 285-kWh battery and
150 km all-electric range to be 106 e/1000 tkm, of which 6% is the electricity
cost.2 This cost estimate is based on the IEA estimate that battery-electric
trucks are presently at least 80% more expensive than traditional diesel trucks
given the current fledgling market for heavy duty battery applications.



















F / D 55 18 1,2 30 104,2 104,2
N / D 55 18 1,2 27,4 101,6 101,6
Before tech progress
F / E 100 6 0,35 25 6,46 131,35 137,81
N / E 100 6 0,35 25 5,82 131,35 137,16
After tech progress
F / E 64 6 0,35 25 3,23 95,35 98,58
N / E 64 6 0,35 25 2,91 95,35 98,25
F = Forerunner N = Neighbor D = Diesel E = Electric
With technological progress expected for batteries, the incremental cost of cate-
nary electric trucks may decrease by 80% (IEA, 2017a) and in Table 3.1 this
makes the capital cost plus fuel cost of electric trucks more interesting than the
diesel truck. As the cost of batteries is mainly driven by the demand for electric
cars, we consider this technological progress as exogenous in this chapter.
The technological progress for catenary electric trucks can only make them com-
2This assumes an electric truck efficiency of 69 kWh/1000 tkm (Liimatainen, van Vliet, and
Aplyn, 2019).
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petitive if the cost of installing electric highways (EH) is not prohibitive. Fraun-
hofer ISI (2018) estimates the cost to construct a catenary electric road system
at 1,7 million e per km in both directions. Using a 20-year time horizon and
5% interest rate, the annualized cost to electrify all motorways in Sweden is
around 290 million e and for all motorways in Germany it is 1.774 million e
(IEA, 2017a). This is the estimate we use when only Sweden builds electric mo-
torways. When also Germany builds electric motorways, there is a learning by
doing effect that reduces the unit cost of infrastructure by 50%.
To appreciate the potential interest of electric highways, even if it is a fixed
cost, we can look into the average cost of infrastructure for the domestic truck
tkm plus half of the international truck tkm. The average cost of the electric
highway infrastructure without technological progress is then 5,82 e/1000 tkm
for Germany. It is only when technological progress decreases the investment
cost by 50% that catenary trucks become really interesting: even in Germany,
the average cost, including external costs and infrastructure costs, would become
lower for an electric truck than for a diesel truck. Another insight we can extract
from Table 3.1 is that the average cost of the catenary truck option is more
interesting than the full electric truck option that foregoes the recharging via
catenary lines. Dropping the catenary electricity supply option would save 5,82
(2,91 with tech progress) e/1000 tkm, but could increase the capital cost of the
electric truck by 31,5 e/1000 tkm.
There are two more important cost parameters that need to be discussed to judge
the economics of electric trucks. The first is the external cost of trucks. The
second factor is the distance tax on trucks. The external cost of trucks consists of
non-climate related costs and the climate costs. The non-climate external cost of
fossil fuel trucks includes the costs of air pollution, noise, accidents, congestion,
and infrastructure wear and tear (van Essen et al., 2019). The external cost of
fossil fuel trucks in Sweden is 30 e/1000 tkm, based on a climate damage cost
of 100 e/tonne of CO2. In Germany, the external cost of fossil fuel trucks is
27,4 e/1000 tkm, based on a much lower climate damage cost of 28 e/tonne of
CO2. The external cost of electric trucks in both countries is 25 e/1000 tkm
(van Essen et al., 2019). Accidents and congestion costs are identical for the
two truck technologies. Electric trucks will have higher infrastructure wear and
tear costs due to the heavy battery; however, with reductions in climate, noise
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and air pollution, they are expected to generate an overall lower external cost
compared to diesel trucks.
Note the relatively minor role for climate costs in the overall average costs of
different types of trucks. When Sweden takes a damage value for greenhouse gas
emissions of 100 e/tonne of CO2, this translates into a 5 e extra per 1000 tkm
to be compared with a fuel cost of 16 e for a diesel truck.
Ideally, the distance tax is set equal to the external cost. In practice, countries
use the distance taxes not only to pay for external costs, but also to extract
revenues from foreign trucks. The distance taxes rather than the external costs
will determine the type of truck selected by the trucking companies.
For the calibration of the model we need two more data. The cost of switching
trucks is set equal to 4 e/1000 tkm, which includes the time delays, labor, and
equipment required to unload and load the electric and diesel trucks (Hanssen,
Mathisen, and Jørgensen, 2012). To calibrate our linear demand functions for
domestic and international transport we need the price elasticity. We take the
fuel price elasticity of -0,25 and the distance charge elasticity of -0,125 (based on
De Jong et al. (2010)) which come down to a money cost elasticity of -0,5. All
data used are summarized in C.1.
We discuss the results in two steps. First, we analyze the outcome of the distance
tax setting game for each possible electric highway equipment scenario. Next,
we analyze the pay-off for the different players by adding the electric highway
investment costs.
3.4.1 Distance taxes
To clarify the insights of our results, we use identical fuel taxes for the forerunner
and the neighboring country. This means that there will be no competition on
fuel taxes and we can concentrate on the setting of distance taxes for diesel and
for electric trucks. Two elements will drive the results. First, the higher assess-
ment of the climate damage by the forerunner that leads to a higher external cost
for diesel trucks than in the neighboring country. Second, the relative size of the
country that makes tax exporting more interesting for the smaller country. For
comparison: Germany has a relative size (γ = 0, 85), so the forerunner Sweden
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would be a rather small country. We include in all the tables a sensitivity study
on the relative size parameter, varying γ from 0,5 to 0,9.
The results reported in Table 3.2 represent the Nash equilibrium of distance taxes
in e/1000 tkm for each scenario. As the investment costs for electric highways
are fixed costs, we consider them only in Table 3.3.
Table 3.2: Optimal distance taxes varying relative country sizes
γ = 0, 5 γ = 0, 7 γ = 0, 9
Diesel trucks only
F / D 30,58 31,74 37,16
N / D 27,96 27,44 27,12
Forerunner electric; int’l diesel trucks
F / D 31,77 32,94 38,36
F / E 25,00 25,00 25,00
N / D 27,93 27,43 27,11
Forerunner electric; Border-switching
F / D >31,77 > 32,94 > 38,36
F / E 26,40 27,46 32,42
N / D 27,98 27,40 27,05
Both countries electric trucks
F / E 26,64 27,92 33,98
N / E 26,64 26,04 25,67
We start by discussing the case where both countries are of equal size, γ = 0, 5.
First, as expected, in the case where both countries use only diesel trucks or only
electric trucks there is pure tax exporting: each country taxes the international
traffic above the external cost in order to get extra distance tax revenues. In
the case of diesel trucks, we see for the forerunner 30,58 e/1000 tkm and for the
neighbor, 27,96 e/1000 tkm. The forerunner sets a higher diesel distance tax
because it considers a higher external climate cost. In the case of electric trucks,
both countries set a distance tax of 26,64 e/1000 tkm. Collectively, they create
a welfare loss by setting the tax above the marginal external cost. However, in a
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non-cooperative equilibrium each country still benefits from raising its taxes on
international trucks.
The smaller the forerunner country’s size, the higher it will set the distance tax
as the cost of distorting domestic trucking becomes less important. Further, they
will be in a position to gain more from taxing international traffic as the countries
share the consumer surplus from international trucking equally, despite the size
difference. The neighboring country faces the opposite incentives; the larger that
it is, the lower it will set the distance tax as this will hurt less domestic trucking
and will attain disproportionately lower gains from international trucking.
Next, consider the second case where the forerunner has domestic electric trucks,
but all international trucks remain diesel trucks. The forerunner will set the
distance tax on electric vehicles equal to the external costs of the electric domestic
trucks (25 e/1000 tkm). The forerunner’s distance tax on diesel trucks 31,77
e/1000 tkm, however, will increase as this tax now only falls upon international
trucking where the tax revenue motive plays. The tax will not be too high in order
to prevent international trucks from switching at the border. The neighboring
country has a smaller external cost for diesel trucks and domestic diesel trucks
are relatively more important. For this reason, the neighboring country sets
a lower diesel distance tax. Moreover, the neighbor could easily use a slightly
lower fuel tax and in this way it gets all the fuel tax revenue from international
trucking.
In the third case, the international trucks driving in the forerunner country have
to switch to an electric tractor and this implies that forerunner’s distance tax on
electric trucks now becomes also an instrument to export taxes and this increases
the tax. Additionally, the tax will become higher when the forerunner is relatively
smaller. The neighbor continues to use diesel trucks within its borders and it
sets the distance tax slightly higher than the external cost because there remains
a revenue motive for the international diesel trucks on its territory.
Fourth, when both countries only use electric trucks, we see the same profile of
tax exporting as in the case with diesel trucks only: distance taxes will be higher
than the external costs of electric trucks that amount to 25 e/1000 tkm.
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3.4.2 Welfare
In Table 3.3, we calculate the welfare gains of the scenario where both countries
have the same size for each of the four scenarios. Table 3.3 gives the three
main components of the welfare per country on an annualized basis. The first
column reports the change in consumer surplus from domestic trucking plus
the tax revenues on domestic trucks minus the change in external costs. The
second column gives the change in half of the consumer surplus from international
trucking plus the change in tax revenues and minus external costs. The last
column gives the annualized cost of electric highways.











Forerunner γ = 0, 5
F / D & N / D 16.349 806
F / E ; int’l diesel trucks + 3.464 - 10 - 516
F / E; Border-switching + 3.175 + 4 - 516
F / E & N / E + 3.127 + 126 - 516
Neighbor γ = 0, 5
F / D & N / D 17.322 806
F / E ; int’l diesel trucks + 4 - 1
F / E; Border-switching -1 + 4
F / E & N / E + 2.541 + 126 - 258
When only the forerunner installs electric highways and only domestic trucking
is electrified, there is an important gain in domestic consumer surplus (3.464
million e/year) for the forerunning country. This is the result of the much lower
operating and external cost of the electric trucks. The major cost is the in-
vestment in electric highways (516 million e/year). The international consumer
surplus and tax revenues barely change. The welfare gain is entirely due to the
assumed strong technological progress in catenary trucks: without the techno-
logical progress of an 80% reduction in the incremental cost of this type of trucks
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(from 100 to 64 e/1000 tkm), there would be a loss of domestic consumer surplus
of 9.943 million e instead of the gain of 3.464 million e.3 To guarantee that there
is a break-even result in terms of welfare with domestic electric trucks, one needs
technological progress that decreases the cost of catenary electric trucks from
100 to 77 e/1000 tkm. In the neighboring country, there are almost no welfare
effects as, by assumption, only the forerunner country switches to electric trucks.
In the third case, the forerunner country forces the international trucks to change
tractors at the border. The main change is in the international surplus: operat-
ing costs decrease as international trucks use electric tractors in the forerunner
country, however, the added cost of switching tractors at the border results in a
net increase in operating costs. Per 1000 tkm, these effects are small: operating
costs are 3 e cheaper for an electric truck compared to a diesel truck but there
is a cost of 4 e for switching tractors at the border. There is a small gain for the
international consumer surplus (+ 4 million e) but this is compensated by the
loss in domestic consumer surplus as the distance tax is now increased beyond
the external cost of electric trucks. In summary, forcing international trucks to
switch tractors at the border is not welfare improving for the forerunner country.
In the fourth case, both countries install electric highways. Now, there is a welfare
benefit for the forerunner country that is generated by the lower operating costs
of domestic trucks and international trucks. However, the net welfare effect for
the forerunner country is still highest when the forerunner country has only the
domestic trucking powered by electricity. The neighboring country also benefits
from switching to electricity, but the gain for its domestic trucks is lower than for
the forerunner country because of the lower climate damage it considers. When
both countries install electric highways, one can expect that learning by doing
reduces the installation costs of electric highways. Here, we assumed a reduction
in the installation cost in the neighbor country by a factor of two.
As the neighboring country benefits from installing electric highways, the Nash
equilibrium will be that both countries install electric highways and that all do-
mestic and international truck traffic is electrified. This result hinges on the
technological progress for catenary trucks and to a much lesser extent on the
learning by doing for the installation of electric highways. When there is less
3This is the result of optimal distance charges that are slightly different than the one of
Table 3.2 because the optimal tax setting depends on the operating costs.
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technological progress for electric trucks, the forerunner may still find it interest-
ing to see electric trucks operate domestically. But the appetite of the neighbor
to install electric trucks will be smaller as the climate damage is smaller. Even
the learning by doing for the installation of electric highways may be insufficient
to convince the neighbor country to electrify its trucking.
Consider next the case of a small forerunner, whose domestic transport is only
10% of the sum of domestic transport in both countries. Table 3.4 reports the
welfare effects with technological progress for this case where the forerunner is
smaller (γ = 0, 1).











Forerunner γ = 0, 1
F / D & N / D 2.999 826
F / E ; int’l diesel trucks + 963 - 2 - 103
F / E; Border-switching + 658 - 55 - 103
F / E & N / E + 593 + 108 - 103
Neighbor γ = 0, 9
F / D & N / D 31.493 826
F / E ; int’l diesel trucks + 1 - 1
F / E; Border-switching + 21 - 55
F / E & N / E + 3.921 + 108 - 464
In the baseline, the forerunner levies large distance taxes to extract revenue from
international trucks as the tax distortion on domestic trucking has become less
important. Again, in this case the forerunner country will benefit from having
domestic traffic electrified. Forcing international trucks to become electric by
switching at the border is not beneficial for the forerunning country. Therefore,
as in the scenario with equal-sized countries, the Nash equilibrium will have both
countries electrifying their truck transport. The determining factor remains the
technological progress for catenary electric trucks and less so the cost reductions
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in the electric highways.
3.5 Conclusions
The aim of this chapter is to provide a deeper understanding of how international
competition affects investment in new infrastructure and distance tax pricing for
long-haul electric trucks. We design a game that analyzes the possible pricing
and investment strategy of one forerunner country that wants to invest in electric
trucks and catenary electric highway infrastructure, but faces lagging neighbors.
We study the outcome of this international coordination game exploring the non-
cooperative outcome varying the relative size of the forerunner in international
truck traffic and varying the cost of electric highways. Though this stylized model
may not capture all of the costs associated with the transition from fossil fuel
to electric trucks, it provides several insights into the international welfare gains
associated with a forerunner country taking the leap, regardless of its relative
size.
An important insight is that we still need a significant drop (36%) in the purchase
costs of catenary electric trucks before a forerunning country that uses a high
carbon value (100 e/tonne CO2) decides to install electric highways. Forcing
international trucks to switch to an electric tractor is not interesting for the
forerunner country. The major reason why a neighbor country using a lower
carbon value would electrify too is, again, the technological progress for catenary
electric trucks that enables a decrease in the operating costs and makes electric
trucks cheaper to use than diesel trucks.
We consider several model extensions that we leave for future research. First,
making fuel taxes endogenous in the model, such that they respond to the strate-
gic distance taxes set in each country. Second, introducing dual engine trucks
as a third vehicle option. The dual engine trucks would have a lower capital
investment and higher operating costs compared to the electric truck. While
this could serve as a bridging technology from diesel to full electric trucks for
the neighboring country, it could also hinder adoption of electric vehicles in the
neighboring country. Finally, including transit countries, such as Switzerland,
that trucks pass through without making any deliveries. A transit country will
have a different strategy for setting distance taxes and installing electric highways
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given that it does not benefit from international ’pass through’ trips. Depending
on the size and location of the transit country it can levy exorbitant distance
taxes thereby earning revenue for the government, without a significant reduc-
tion in the number of transit trips. A successful example of this policy in a
transit country is the Heavy Vehicle Tax in Switzerland, which levies a fee on
all trucks over 3,5 tonnes entering Swiss borders (Eidgenössische Zollverwaltung,
2017). This fee is set based on the truck’s weight, emissions, and the number of
kilometers driven in Switzerland. In this way, it addresses the carbon emissions
and congestion-related externalities arising from the ’pass through’ trips.
Appendix A




Annual ownership tax (GV) 100 e
GV market price 3500 e/veh
GV production tax 0 e/veh
GV production cost 3000 e/veh
GV non-FE cost 2500 e/veh
GV fuel efficiency 0,056 L/km
Gasoline cost 0,6 e/L
Gasoline tax 0,68 e/L
Gasoline carbon intensity 0,023 tonne CO2/L
External cost of non-carbon emissions (L) 0,0049 e/km
External cost of non-carbon emissions (S) 0,0148 e/km
External cost of noise emissions (L) 0,0002 e/km
External cost of noise emissions (S) 0,02 e/km
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Electric vehicle parameters
EV market price 6073 e/veh
Annual ownership subsidy (EV) -400 e
EV production tax 0 e/veh
EV battery cost 2429 e/veh
EV non-battery cost 3644 e/veh
Lifetime of EV 10 years
Battery capacity 30 kWh
EV energy efficiency 0,2 kWh/km
Price of off-peak electricity 0,15 e/kWh
Price of on-peak electricity 0,3 e/kWh
Price of charging electricity 0,6 e/kWh
Off-peak electricity carbon intensity 0 tonne
CO2/kWh
On-peak electricity carbon intensity 0,0004408 tonne
CO2/kWh
External cost of non-carbon emissions (L) 0,0099 e/km
External cost of non-carbon emissions (S) 0,0072 e/km
External cost of noise emissions (L) 0,0001 e/km
External cost of noise emissions (S) 0,0105 e/km
Disutility of charging 1 e/kWh
Cost for home charging station 500 e
Gov’t subsidy for charging station 0 e
Price of network externality 0,0000003 e/kWh
Initial stock 75000 veh
General parameters
Target fuel efficiency 1 0,041 L/vkm
Target fuel efficiency 2 0,0287 L/vkm
Distance tax 0 e/km
External cost of congestion (L) 0,11 e/km
External cost of congestion (S) 0,28 e/km
External cost of accidents (L) 0,0214 e/km
External cost of accidents (S) 0,0543 e/km
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Rate of learning by doing 0,15
Rate of knowledge building with R&D 0,15
Appendix B
Appendix to Chapter 2
B.1 Parameter values
Parameter Value Units
Total EU road freight 13.417 billion tkm
Fixed cost low FE truck 55 e/1000 tkm
Fixed cost high FE truck 55 e/1000 tkm
Low fuel efficiency 24 L/1000 tkm
Diesel cost 0,78 e/L
Diesel tax 0,5 e/L
Diesel carbon intensity 2,67 kg CO2/L
External cost 25 e/1000 tkm
Carbon damage cost 25 e/tonne
CO2
Baseline R&D expenditure 545 million e
Elasticity of productivity and R&D 0,3
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Appendix C
Appendix to Chapter 3
C.1 Parameter values
Parameter Value Units
Germany domestic road freight 297 billion tkm
Sweden domestic road freight 37 billion tkm
International road freight 16 billion tkm
Average truck payload-mileage 2.000.000 tkm
Capital cost fossil fuel truck 55 e/1000 tkm
Capital cost electric truck 100 e/1000 tkm
Fuel efficiency 24 L/1000 tkm
Diesel cost 18 e/1000 tkm
Electric truck fuel efficiency 69 kWh/1000
tkm
Electricity cost 6,21 e/1000 tkm
External cost diesel truck neighbor 27,4 e/1000 tkm
External cost diesel truck forerunner 30 e/1000 tkm
External cost electric truck 25 e/1000 tkm
Electric highways infrastructure annuity 136.412 e/km
Germany total length of motorways 13.009 km
Sweden total length of motorways 12.132 km
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Distance charge elasticity -0,125
Fuel price elasticity -0,25
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Eidgenössische Zollverwaltung (2017). Leistungsabhängige Schwerverkehrsab-
gabe. Schweizerische Eidgenossenschaft.
Eggert, H. and M. Greaker (2014). Promoting Second Generation Biofuels: Does
the First Generation Pave the Road? Energies 7, 7, 4430-4445.
Eliasson, J. and S. Proost (2015). Is sustainable transport policy sustainable?
Transport Policy 37, 92-100.
European Alternative Fuels Observatory (2019). Germany - Incentives and Leg-
islation. https://www.eafo.eu/countries/germany/1734/incentives
European Automobile Manufacturers Association (2019). ACEA Economic and
Market Report – Full-year 2019.
European Commission (2016). A European Strategy for Low-Emission Mobility.
{COM 0501 final}. European Union, Brussels.
European Commission (2017a). EC impact assessment for enhanced fuel effi-
ciency in cars and zero emission vehicles. {COM SWD 650 final}, Brussels.
European Commission (2017b). Electrification of the Transport System. Euro-
pean Union, Brussels.
European Commission (2019a). The European Green Deal. {COM 640 fi-
nal}European Union, Brussels..
Bibliography 112
European Commission (2019b). Regulation (EU) 2019/631 setting CO2 emission
performance standards for new passenger cars and for new light commercial
vehicles. textitOfficial Journal of the European Union, L 111 / 13 - 53.
European Commission (2019c). Regulation (EU) 2019/1242 CO2 emission per-
formance standards for new heavy-duty vehicles. textitOfficial Journal of the
European Union, L 198 / 202 - 240.
European Commission (2020). Stepping up Europe’s 2030 climate ambition -
Investing in a climate-neutral future for the benefit of our people. {COM 562
final}European Commission Directorate General for Climate Action, Brussels.
European Environment Agency (2017). Transport greenhouse gas emissions.
EEA, Copenhagen.
European Environment Agency (2019). Transport fuel prices and taxes in Eu-
rope. EEA, Copenhagen.
European Parliament (2019). Parliament backs new
CO2 emissions limits for cars and vans.https://www.
europarl.europa.eu/news/en/press-room/20190321IPR32112/
parliament-backs-new-co2-emissions-limits-for-cars-and-vans.
Accessed 05 April 2019.
Eurostat (2017). Inland freight transport. https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/
statistics-explained/index.php?title=File:Inland_freight_
transport,_2017.png. Accessed 10 November 2019.
Eurostat (2019a). Electricity prices for non-household consumers.
https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/statistics-explained/index.php?
title=File:Electricity_prices_for_non-household_consumers,
_first_half_2019_(EUR_per_kWh).png. Accessed 17 November 2019.
Eurostat (2019b). Total length of motorways. https://ec.europa.eu/
eurostat/databrowser/view/ttr00002/default/table?lang=en. Accessed
15 November 2019.
Eurostat (2020a). Electricity prices for household consumers. https://ec.
europa.eu/eurostat/statistics-explained/index.php/Electricity_
price_statistics#Electricity_prices_for_household_consumers.
Accessed 10 July 2020.
Bibliography 113
Eurostat (2020b). Summary of annual road freight transport. https:
//ec.europa.eu/eurostat/databrowser/view/road_go_ta_tott/
default/table?lang=en. Accessed 25 August 2020.
Felder, S. and T.F. Rutherford (1993). Unilateral CO2 reductions and carbon
leakage: the consequences of international trade in oil and basic materials.
Journal of Environmental Economics and Management 25 (2), 162-176.
Fischer, C. and R.G. Newell (2007). Environmental and technology policies for
climate mitigation. Resources for the Future Discussion Paper 04-05 (revised),
Washington DC.
Fischer, C. and R.G. Newell (2008). Environmental and technology policies for
climate mitigation. Journal of Environmental Economics and Management 55,
142-162.
Fraunhofer ISI (2018). Alternative drive trains and fuels in road freight transport
– recommendations for action in Germany. Karlsruhe, Berlin, Heidelberg.
Gillingham, K. and J.H. Stock (2018). The Cost of Reducing Greenhouse Gas
Emissions. Journal of Economic Perspectives 32 (4), 53–72.
Goulder, L.H., Jacobson M.R., and van Benthem A.A. (2012). Unintended conse-
quences from nested and federal regulations: the case of the Pavley greenhouse-
gas-per-mile limits. Journal of Environmental Economics and Management 63,
187-207.
Goulder, L.H. and S.H. Schneider (1999). Induced technological change and the
attractiveness of CO2 abatement policies. Resource and Energy Economics
21 (3-4), 211-253.
Greaker, M. and M. Kristoffersen (2017). Charging of electric cars: Should we
accept several standards? Research Council of Norway, Oslo, 2017.
Greaker, M. and K. Midttømme (2016). Network effects and environmental ex-
ternalities: Do clean technologies suffer from excess inertia? Journal of Public
Economics 143, 27-38.
Greaker, M., C. Hagem, and S. Proost (2019). Optimal battery size for EV and
storage services to the grid. DP CREE.
Bibliography 114
Greene, D. (2010). Why the market for new passenger cars generally undervalues
strongly fuel economy. OECD/ITF Joint Transport Research Centre Discus-
sion Paper No. 2010-6.
Grigolon, L., M. Reynaert and F. Verboven (2018). Consumer Valuation of Fuel
Costs and tax policy: evidence from the European car market. American Eco-
nomic Journal: Economic Policy, 10 (3), 193-225.
Hanssen, T., T. Mathisen, and F. Jørgensen (2012). Generalized transport costs
in intermodal freight transport. Procedia – Social and Behavioral Sciences 54,
189-200.
Hardman, S., A. Chandan, G. Tal, and T. Turrentine (2017). The effectiveness
of financial purchase incentives for battery electric vehicles - A review of the
evidence. Renewable and Sustainable Energy Reviews 80, 1100-1111.
Haugneland, P. et al. (2017). Put a price on carbon to fund EV incentives -
Norwegian EV policy success. EVS30 International Battery, Hybrid, and Fuel
Cell Electric Vehicle Symposium, Stuttgart.
ICCT (2018). Statistical Yearbooks.
IEA (2007). Mind the Gap, Quantifying Principle-Agent Problems in Energy
Efficiency. IEA, Paris.
IEA (2017a). The Future of Trucks: Implications for energy and the environment,
OECD/IEA, Paris.
IEA (2017b). Mobility Model. IEA, Paris.
IEA (2019). World Energy Outlook 2019. IEA, Paris.
IEA (2021). Electric car registrations and market share in selected countries,
2015-2020. IEA, Paris.




IPCC (2018). An IPCC Special Report on the impacts of global warming of
1.5◦C above pre-industrial levels and related global greenhouse gas emission
Bibliography 115
pathways, in the context of strengthening the global response to the threat
of climate change, sustainable development, and efforts to eradicate poverty
[Masson-Delmotte, V., P. Zhai, H.-O. Poertner, D. Roberts, J. Skea, P.R.
Shukla, A. Pirani, W. Moufouma-Okia, C. Péan, R. Pidcock, S. Connors,
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